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I. Introduction
"[P]ublic financing ... as it exists today is broken."' Then-Senator Barack
Obama offered this revealing assertion on June 19, 2008 as he declared his
intent to become the first major party general election candidate to opt out of
the voluntary system for public funding of presidential elections in the nearly
thirty-five years since the program's establishment in the wake of Watergate.2
At first, Obama received heavy criticism for rescinding his (unofficial) earlier
pledges to accept public money.3  These opening chides, however, later
1. Shailagh Murray & Perry Bacon Jr., Obama to Reject Public Funds for Election,
WASH. PosT, June 20, 2008, at Al.
2. See Adam Nagourney & Jeff Zeleny, Obama Forgoes Public Funds in Firstfor Major
Candidate, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2008, at AI (discussing the historical significance of Obama's
decision to forgo general election public campaign funds in the 2008 Presidential Election).
3. See, e.g., id. (presenting a statement by Obama's Republican opponent, Senator John
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morphed into debate about the efficacy and sustainability of the current
presidential election public financing system after Obama's campaign
fundraising efforts vastly exceeded the subsidy granted to his publicly funded
opponent, Senator John McCain.4
As the latest discussions about public campaign financing have centered
on Obama's decision, little attention has been paid to the fact that on June 26,
2008, only one week after Obama's announcement, U.S. public funding
programs took a prospective second blow. On that date, the same day it ruled
on the landmark Second Amendment case, District of Columbia v. Heller,5 the
Supreme Court decided Davis v. FEC.6 In Davis, the Court declared that a
provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),7 called the
"Millionaire's Amendment," violated the First Amendment rights of wealthy
congressional candidates. 9 The ruling concerning the fairly obscure legal area
of campaign finance regulation drew little hype in comparison to the handgun
opinion.10 Despite its lack of publicity, however, Davis raises important
questions about the efficacy of an increasingly popular campaign finance
McCain, questioning Obama's change-of-heart with regards to receiving public funding after
Obama had indicated several times that he would accept the subsidy).
4. See, e.g., Jim Wooten, Public Campaign Financing is Dead, ATLANTA J. CONST., (Oct.
22, 2008), http://www.ajc.com/opinion/content/sharedblogs/ajc/thinkingright/entries/2008/l 0
/22/public-campaignfinancing isd.html (last visited Sept. 29,2009) ("Without doubt, we are
seeing the end of public financing in presidential campaigns. When this election rolls around,
the money raised and spent by the Obama campaign will have rolled it into the morgue with
Prohibition.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821-22 (2008) (holding that the
Second Amendment bestows a right to keep and bear arms and that a District of Columbia
statute barring handgun possession, and the rendering of any handgun operable, in the home
violated that Second Amendment right).
6. See Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2775 (2008) (holding that BCRA's Millionaire's
Amendment violated the First Amendment because it imposed a substantial burden on the right
of a candidate to use unlimited personal funds in campaign speech absent a compelling state
interest justifying the law).
7. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.). BCRA is also called
"McCain-Feingold" to recognize the legislation's bipartisan sponsors, Senators John McCain
and Russ Feingold. Michael J. Malbin, Assessing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, in THE
ELECTION AFTER REFORM: MONEY, PoLmcs, AND THE BiPARTISAN CAMPAiGN REFORM ACT, 1, 1
(Michael J. Malbin ed., 2006).
8. See infra notes 176-88 and accompanying text (explaining the Millionaire's
Amendment's purpose and operation, and providing textual excerpts of the law).
9. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2775.
10. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Justices Reject D.C. Ban on Handgun Ownership, WASH.
POST, June 27, 2008, at Al (referring to Heller as the "most anticipated" ruling of the Court's
2007-2008 term).
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reform measure known as "Clean Elections" by placing "rescue funds"-a
critical element of these schemes-on shaky constitutional ground." In light
of this issue, this Note analyzes whether after Davis rescue funds remain a
constitutionally viable component of Clean Elections systems and, in turn,
illustrates that while Heller's roar overwhelmed Davis's whimper, the little
known decision may prove more momentous. '
2
To pursue this end, Part II of this Note provides a brief history of the
rise of the presidential election public funding system and of other
Watergate-induced federal campaign finance reforms. Part III presents the
fundamental constitutional standards that govern campaign expenditures and
contributions, as well as public financing programs, that the Court
established in Buckley v. Valeo 13 and RNC v. FEC.4 Part IV gives a glimpse
of state and municipal public financing systems by: (1) looking at how they
arose in response to Watergate; (2) introducing the radical, but increasingly
popular, public funding reform measure of Clean Elections; (3) surveying the
states and cities that have adopted Clean Elections; and (4) discussing the
Clean Elections programs' use of rescue funds. Part V explains the
jurisprudential dispute that has arisen amongst the circuit courts regarding
whether rescue funds infringe First Amendment rights. Part VI supplies a
succinct overview of BCRA and the Millionaire's Amendment, and presents
the Court's ruling in Davis that found the Millionaire's Amendment
unconstitutional. Part VII analyzes Davis's effect on rescue funds'
constitutionality by evaluating competing arguments and, ultimately,
concludes that pursuant to Davis rescue funds impermissibly burden First
11. See Josh Gerstein, Court Shakes Up Campaign Finance Law, N.Y. SUN, June 27,
2008, at Al (stating that while Davis did not directly affect state and local public funding
systems' legality, it could undermine them by making rescue funds unconstitutional); see also
infra Part IV.B (introducing the concept of Clean Elections); infra Part IV.C (explaining the
purpose and operation of rescue funds provisions in Clean Elections).
12. Posting of Rick Esenberg to Shark and Shepherd, http://sharkandshepherd.blogspot.
com/2008/06/davis-v-fec-days-most-important.html (June 26, 2008, 13:22 EDT) (last visited
Sept. 29, 2009) (suggesting that Davis may be more important than Heller) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (per curiam) (finding the Federal
Election Campaign Act's individual contribution limits, disclosure and reporting provisions, and
presidential election public financing scheme constitutional, but declaring its campaign,
independent expenditures (1E), and candidate personal expenditure limits and its system for
appointment of FEC Commissioners unconstitutional).
14. See Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280, 283-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(three-judge court), affdmem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980) (affirming the district court's conclusion
that the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, which provided public funding to
participating presidential candidates, did not burden the constitutional rights of major party
presidential candidates and their supporters).
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Amendment rights and, in turn, fail strict scrutiny. With this result in mind,
this Note declares that courts should find all challenged rescue funds
provisions unconstitutional and, consequently, warns legislators of the
ensuing end to effective Clean Elections.
II. The Development of Public Funding in U.S. Elections and the Federal
Election Campaign Act
A. Public Campaign Funding's U.S. Origins and the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971
In the United States, the concept of the government subsidizing elections
arose during the twentieth century's initial years.' 5 These early notions,
which included President Theodore Roosevelt during his 1907 State of the
Union Address calling for congressional legislation to provide for public
funding of all federal elections, 16 however, caught little momentum, 7 and six
decades passed before Congress enacted its first public campaign financing
law in 1966.18
Congress's 1966 legislation aimed to provide optional public subsidies
to the major political parties in order to allay the potential influence of
wealthy campaign donors and the burdens imposed by rising campaign
costs.' 9 To supply this money, the bill intended to utilize a U.S. Treasury
account, called the "Presidential Election Campaign Fund," which would
receive financing via a voluntary one dollar check-off on taxpayer tax
returns. 20 The legislation, however, faced heavy criticism in the Senate, and
15. See Anthony Corrado, Money and Politics: A History of Federal Campaign Finance
Law, in THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 1, 13 (2005) (stating that the concept of
public campaign financing dates back as far as 1904, when New York Representative William
Bourke Cockran first suggested the radical idea of the government paying for political
candidates' election costs).
16. See President Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (Dec. 3, 1907)
(declaring that "[t]he need for collecting large campaign funds would vanish if Congress
provided an appropriation for the proper and legitimate expenses of each of the great national
parties, an appropriation ample enough to meet the necessity for thorough organization and
machinery, which requires a large expenditure of money").
17. See Corrado, supra note 15, at 13 (stating that not "even Roosevelt's embrace
could.., persuade many legislators to pursue the notion" of public campaign funding).
18. FEC, Public Funding of Presidential Elections (2008), http://www.fec.gov/
pages/brochures/pubfund.shtml (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) [hereinafter FEC Brochure] (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
19. Corrado, supra note 15, at 19.
20. FEC Brochure, supra note 18.
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although it passed as a rider on an unrelated bill,21 the success proved
fleeting.22 In the spring of 1967, Congress rendered the law inoperative by
postponing the dollar check-off program until the formation of guidelines
governing the disbursement of the collected funds.23
In 1971, however, Congress "signaled the beginning of the modem era of
campaign finance reform" when it enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971 (FECA) 24 to revamp most of the major provisions of the federal
25election laws, including those pertaining to presidential contests. FECA
aimed to cut rising campaign costs in two ways. First, it imposed strict
requirements on candidates to make public disclosures of their campaign
contributions and expenditures.26 Second, it placed limits on the amount a
candidate could spend in support of her own campaign and on media
advertising.27
This reform push also included fresh calls for public campaign funding.
Congress, seeking to mitigate candidate reliance on private donations, enacted,
as part of the Revenue Act of 1971, a presidential election public funding
scheme similar to the one endorsed in 1966.28 For instance, the 1971 public
financing law revived the 1966 legislation's dollar tax check-off system.29
21. See Corrado, supra note 15, at 19 (stating that the Presidential Election Campaign
Fund Act of 1966 only passed the Senate because of its attachment to the Foreign Investors Tax
Act of 1966).
22. See id. (calling the "victory" attained through the 1966 law's passage "short-lived").
23. See, e.g., id. at 19-20 (discussing the various motivations that led Congress to make
the 1966 Presidential Election Campaign Act ultimately inoperative, including concerns that the
provision of subsidies to the national political parties would place too much power in the
parties' leaders' hands).
24. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-42, 451-56 (2006)) (providing for increased
disclosure of contributions in federal election campaigns, and limiting candidate personal funds
and advertising expenditures).
25. Corrado, supra note 15, at 20.
26. Id.
27. Id. FECA limited the amount that a candidate could expend on her own campaign to
$50,000 for presidential candidates, $35,000 for Senate candidates, and $25,000 for House
candidates. Id.
28. See Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, I.R.C. § 9001 (1971) (establishing
guidelines for public funding of presidential elections through a taxpayer dollar check-off
system applicable for taxable years beginning with calendar year 1972); see also Joseph E.
Cantor, Campaign Financing in Federal Elections: A Guide to the Law and its Operation, in
CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATEs: IssuEs AND LAWS 55, 62-63 (Auguste V.
Anschutz ed., 2002) (stating that the Revenue Act of 1971 "intended to lessen candidate
dependence on private money by providing public funds instead").
29. Corrado, supra note 15, at 25.
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Unlike the 1966 law, however, the 1971 bill offered the optional federal
subsidies directly to participating presidential nominees, not their parties.30 It
also established expenditure limits on nominees who received public money
and banned all private contributions to them.3' Together, these policies created
a system of"full public funding" in presidential general elections, which meant
that a nominee could receive a public subsidy in the amount of the statutory
expenditure limit if she agreed to refrain from spending all private money.32
Due to these advancements, the 1971 Revenue Act "formed the basis of the
public funding system in effect today," but the scheme as it exists presently did
not come to fruition until Watergate incited immense federal campaign finance
reform in 1974. 33
B. Watergate and the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments
The Watergate investigations' revelation of several improprieties by
President Nixon's 1972 presidential campaign raised questions regarding
money's deleterious effect on the political process and highlighted the existing
federal election laws' failings.34 "[A] searching debate on campaign financing
and how it could be reformed to prevent future Watergate-type abuses"
ensued,35 and, in 1974, Congress responded to national cries for change in
campaign finance regulation by overhauling FECA.36 These amendments,
Congress's most comprehensive campaign finance reform legislation to date,
37
30. FEC Brochure, supra note 18.
31. Id.
32. See Corrado, supra note 15, at 24 (explaining the concept and operation of"full public
funding").
33. FEC Brochure, supra note 18.
34. See Corrado, supra note 15, at 22 (describing the questions about money's influence
in politics raised by the findings that Nixon's 1972 campaign included a vast number of large
contributions and other improprieties such as acceptance of proscribed corporate gifts and the
existence of slush funds containing millions of dollars that helped fund the Watergate break-in).
35. Dollar Politics: The Issue of Campaign Spending, 2 CONG. Q., Oct. 1974, at 22.
36. See Corrado, supra note 15, at 22, for a discussion of how Congress responded to the
national uproar caused by Watergate through enactment of the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (amended 1976, 1980, & 1986) (amending the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, §§ 101-06,201-06,309-11,401,
86 Stat. 3 (1972)) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 26
U.S.C.).
37. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7 (1976) (per curiam) (calling the 1974 FECA
amendments "by far the most comprehensive reform legislation (ever) passed by Congress
concerning the election of the President, Vice-President, and members of Congress") (citations
omitted).
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established the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to serve as a bipartisan
agency responsible for administering election laws and implementing the public
funding system.38 The revisions retained 1971 's ceilings on candidate personal
expenditures; 39 yet, they provided for new campaign contribution limits that
sought to reduce the risk of corruption posed by large donations.4° For
example, the amended legislation restricted individual contributions to $1,000
per person, per election cycle, and aggregate individual contributions to all
federal candidates and political committees to $25,000.41 Other provisions of
the amendments set a $1,000 per election maximum on independent
expenditures (IEs)-money spent by an individual or interest group on behalf
of a "clearly identified" candidate but absent the candidate's request or
consent-and established a threshold on a candidate's collective campaign
spending.42 Additionally, the altered law finalized creation of the system for
public funding of presidential elections currently in force.43 It did so by
extending the 1971 Revenue Act's public financing provisions to presidential
primary elections and to the presidential nominating conventions of the national
parties. 44
I1. Buckley v. Valeo and RNC v. FEC: Campaign Finance's
Constitutional Framework
The amended version of FECA, including the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund Act, faced almost immediate court challenge. In 1976's
Buckley v. Valeo, "the first and most important of the campaign finance
cases,"45 the Supreme Court assessed the constitutionality of various aspects of
the law.4 6 The resulting per curiam opinion created constitutional guidelines
that continue to oversee campaign finance regulations.47 Buckley, for instance,
38. Corrado, supra note 15, at 24.
39. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the 1971 FECA personal funds
expenditure limitations).
40. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7.
41. Cantor, supra note 28, at 63.
42. Id. at 63-64.
43. FEC Brochure, supra note 18.
44. Id.
45. David R. Ortiz, The First Amendment and the Limits of Campaign Finance Reform, in
THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOtRCEBOOK 91, 92 (2005).
46. Id.
47. See id. ("[T]he Supreme Court created [in Buckley] a framework that still guides
[campaign finance] analysis."); see also infra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing how
1272
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established a tenet central to the constitutional analysis of any campaign finance
law: The giving and spending of money in political campaigns equates to
speech, not conduct.48 Political campaign contributions and expenditures
infringe upon the most fundamental of First Amendment activities as
"[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are
integral to the operation of the system of government established by our
Constitution. ,,49 State restrictions on political contributions and expenditures,
therefore, implicate this fundamental First Amendment right.50
A. Buckley's Standards for Contribution and Expenditure Limits
1. Expenditure Limits Substantially Burden Fundamental First
Amendment Rights
Although Buckley found that both expenditure and contribution limits
directly restrain speech, the Court declared that an inherent distinction exists
between the levels of restriction that each type of regulation imposes.5'
Controlling the amount one may contribute to a candidate or political
committee, the Court determined, "entails only a marginal restriction upon the
contributor's ability to engage in free communication. 52  Consequently,
Buckley ruled that contribution limits need only meet "closely drawn" scrutiny
and, therefore, must be closely drawn to serve an important governmental
interest.
53
Expenditure limits, on the other hand, the Court found, entail
"significantly more severe restrictions on protected" First Amendment rights.54
The Buckley Court reached this conclusion because, while spending strictures
remain neutral as to the ideas expressed, they nevertheless, "limit political
expression at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment
courts have adhered to the campaign finance constitutional framework established in Buckley).
48. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (per curiam).
49. Id. at 14.
50. Id. at 23.
51. See Ortiz, supra note 45, at 93 (discussing how Buckley concluded that distinctions
exist between restrictions on campaign spending and contributions because the Court "saw
contributions and expenditures as two quite different kinds of speech").
52. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20.
53. Id. at 25.
54. Id. at 23.
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freedoms."55 Effective political dialogue, Buckley ruled, requires spending
money as
virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society
requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest
handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches
and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the event. The
electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass
media for news and information has made these expensive modes of
communication indispensible instruments of effective political speech.
56
Restrictions on expenditures by candidates and IE-making groups, therefore,
the Court avowed, hamper freedom of expression by limiting "the number of
issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached" and represent substantial, not theoretical, constraints on the quantity
and diversity of political speech.5 7 Additionally, the Buckley Court determined
that limits on the amount of personal funds a candidate could spend on her own
campaign burden that candidate's "First Amendment right to engage in the
discussion of public issues and to vigorously and tirelessly advocate [her] own
election. 5 8 Because of these "substantial burdens," the Court averred that
expenditure limits must meet "exacting scrutiny" and be narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling government interest.59
2. The Compelling State Interest in Preventing Political Corruption and the
Appearance of Such Corruption
With these standards established, the Court contemplated the adequacies
of the governmental interests justifying FECA's contribution and expenditure
limits. The Buckley Court upheld the $1,000 individual contribution ceiling.6°
An overriding state interest in preventing large donations from causing political
process corruption, or creating the appearance of such corruption, the Court
55. Id. at 39 (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 19.
57. Id. The Court analogized freedom to engage in unlimited political expression while
subject to expenditure limits to being able to drive a car as far and often as you desire on one
tank of gas. Id. at 19n.18.
58. Id. at 52.
59. See id. at 44-45 (declaring that expenditure limits' constitutionality "turns on whether
the governmental interests advanced in its support satisfy the exacting scrutiny applicable to
limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression").




concluded, justified the restriction.6' In the Buckley Court's opinion, large,
unlimited contributions can harm the integrity of the political process in two
ways. First, because of campaigns' rising costs, substantial contributions
present a significant threat of "political quid pro quos"--campaign money
given in return for promised political favors.62 Second, the public's belief in
the presence of these deals to secure political favor, whether or not they truly
exist, could prove just as detrimental as their actual being.63 The Court
concluded that Congress had the right to constrain abuse (or potential abuse),
and that FECA's contribution ceilings "focuse[d] precisely on the [large
donation] problem." 64 At the same time, the Court found that the limits did
not materially undermine the ability of individual citizens to "engage in
political debate and discussion., 65 In light of these determinations, the
Buckley Court also upheld FECA's aggregate contribution limitation.6 The
Court decided that this stricture operated to prevent one's ability to
circumvent the $1,000 individual contribution ceiling through massive
donations to political committees likely to contribute to that person's favored
candidate.67
The Buckley Court, though, found that FECA's limits on IEs,6s
candidate spending of personal funds, 69 and aggregate campaign
expenditures 70 less visibly served anticorruption interests. For instance, the
61. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976) (per curiam) (stating that FECA's
contribution mandates "constitute[d] [one of] the Act's primary weapons against the reality or
appearance of improper influence stemming from the dependence of candidates on large
campaign contributions").
62. Id. at 26-27. The Court's view of political process corruption extends beyond quid
pro quo arrangements, to "the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or
the desires of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have made large
financial contributions valued by the officeholder." McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153
(2003).
63. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 ("Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid
pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public
awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial
contributions.").
64. Id. at 28.
65. Id. at 58-59.
66. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing FECA's aggregate contribution
limit).
67. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976) (per curiam).
68. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing FECA's 1E ceiling).
69. See supra notes 27, 39 and accompanying text (discussing FECA's restriction on a
candidate's expenditure of personal funds).
70. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing FECA's constraints on total
campaign spending).
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Court determined that lEs fail to pose a similar threat of political process
corruption because the absence of coordination between the candidate and the
independent group obviates the danger that the expenditures will result in
quid pro quo arrangements. 71 FECA's ceiling on a candidate's use of
personal funds, too, did not further this interest because, the Buckley Court
concluded, expenditures of personal wealth actually reduce a candidate's
dependence on outside contributions and, accordingly, mitigate the coercive
pressures that encourage abuse and corruption.72 In essence, therefore, the
Court decided that "[i] f expenditures could not indebt a candidate to a voter,
they could never give rise to even the appearance of corruption[, and]
regulating them therefore could not be claimed to protect the integrity of the
political process.
7 3
Buckley also discarded an ancillary state goal posited in support of
FECA's expenditure limits. The Government suggested it had an interest in
balancing the abilities of candidates, individuals, and groups to exercise
electoral influence by equalizing relative financial resources.74 The Court
rejected this view, however, declaring that fundamental liberties cannot be
sacrificed in order to achieve greater equality in the political process.75
According to the Buckley Court, the First Amendment aims "to secure the
widest possible dissemination of information... and to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas. 76 Consequently, the Court avowed, "the concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order
to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment," which, the Court ruled, likewise, "cannot tolerate... restriction
upon the freedom of a candidate to speak without legislative limit on behalf of
[her] own candidacy.
77
71. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
72. See id. at 53 (discussing the lack of an oyerriding governmental interest justifying the
burden FECA imposed on a candidate's ability to spend personal finds on campaign speech).
73. Ortiz, supra note 45, at 92-93.
74. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48, 54 (1976) (per curiam) (presenting and
rejecting the government's claimed ancillary justification for requiring FECA's IE limit that
suggested the state could seek to equalize the relative political clout of candidates, individuals,
and groups).
75. See id. at 49 ("The First Amendment's protection against governmental abridgement
of free expression cannot properly be made to depend on a person's financial ability to engage
in public discussion.").




B. Buckley and RNC Establish Public Funding Standards
Unlike its ruling on expenditure limits, the Buckley Court upheld the
system for public funding of presidential elections against various constitutional
challenges, including the assertion that the scheme violated the First
Amendment.78 The Court determined that the program serves an anticorruption
purpose by eliminating a candidate's reliance on large contributions. 79 Further,
the Buckley Court declared that the government has the right to, and frequently
does, promote speech through legislation. 80 Thus, Congress, according to
Buckley, in creating the presidential election public financing scheme, simply
"further[ed] ... pertinent First Amendment values" by "enlarg[ing] public
discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital to self-
governing people" and, therefore, had not "abridged" unlawfully freedom of
speech.8' Additionally, the Court ruled that while mandatory limits on
campaign expenditures violate a candidate's First Amendment rights, Congress
can establish a system where the government conditions receipt of public funds
on the candidate's agreement to limit campaign expenditures.82 As long as a
candidate remains free to not participate in public financing and to raise and
spend unlimited private money, the public funding system survives
constitutional challenge.83 According to the Court:
Congress may engage in public financing of election campaigns and may
condition acceptance of public funds on an agreement by the candidate to
abide by specified expenditure limitations. Just as a candidate may
voluntarily limit the size of the contributions he chooses to accept, he may
decide to forgo private fundraising and accept public funding.
In light of this declaration, the Court in Republican National Committee v.
FEC (RNC) expressly affirmed that the system for public funding of
78. The plaintiffs unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of the public funding
scheme on three grounds: (1) as contrary to the General Welfare Clause-Article I, Section 8,
Clause 2; (2) as inconsistent with the First Amendment; and (3) as violative of the Fifth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 90-108.
79. Id. at 96.
80. See id. at 93 n. 127 (stating that government promotion of speech, unlike religion, "is
the rule, not the exception").
81. Id. at 92-93.
82. Id. at 57 n.65.
83. Id.; see also Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1549 (8th Cir. 1996) (explaining
Buckley's holding, which made it permissible for the government to establish a voluntary public
financing system that conditioned a candidate's receipt of the public subsidy on acceptance of
expenditure limits).
84. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
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presidential elections, which imposes expenditure limits as a condition to
receiving public funds, does not burden a candidate's First Amendment rights
by imposing expenditure limits as a condition on receiving public funds.8 5
According to the RNC court, nothing about the scheme makes it coercive such
that candidates feel compelled to participate involuntarily.86 Instead, the court
in RNC found that, under the program, presidential candidates remain free to
opt out of the system and to raise private money beyond the available subsidy
grant.8 7 A rational presidential candidate, therefore, RNC declared, chooses the
option most beneficial to her campaign, and a plain increase in campaign
financing options imposes no First Amendment burden. 8
IV. The Rise of State and Local Public Funding Programs, Clean Elections,
and Rescue Funds
A. State and Municipal Public Campaign Funding Systems
During the decade following Watergate, states and municipalities also
sought to reform their campaign finance laws.89 As part of these reforms, after
Buckley upheld the constitutionality of the presidential election public funding
system, several states even implemented their own public funding programs. In
1973, four states-Iowa, Maine, Rhode Island, and Utah-enacted the first
state-level campaign subsidy systems. 9° By 1984, nineteen states had some
form of candidate or party public financing. 9' These schemes, like the
presidential elections' program, sought equity in access to, and utilization of,
85. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280,283-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (three-
judge court), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
86. Id. at 283.
87. See id. (declaring that the scheme did not compel presidential candidates to accept
public funding because "[e]ach candidate remain[ed] free under the [system], instead of opting
for public funding, to attempt through private funding to raise more than the. . . public funding
limit and to spend... without any ceiling").
88. Id. at 285.
89. See MICHAEL J. MALBIN & THOMAS L. GAis, THE DAY AFTER REFORM: SOBERING
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES 13 (1998) (describing the explosion
in state-level campaign finance reform during the half-dozen years following Watergate).
90. Ruth S. Jones, State Public Financing and the State Parties, in PARTIES, INTEREST
GROuPS, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 283, 283 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 1984). In 1979,
Seattle, Washington, became the first municipality to implement public campaign funding in
city elections. National Civic League, Local Campaign Finance Reform: Case Studies,
Innovative and Model Legislation, http://www.ncl.org/npp/lcfr/lcfr-first-ed-summary.html (last
visited Sept. 29, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
91. See MALBIN & GAms, supra note 89, at 22.
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campaign money; reduction of campaign costs; and limited dependence (or
apparent dependence) on large campaign contributors. 92 By the mid-1980s,
these high ambitions succumbed to increasing anti-tax movements and
heightening fiscal constraints, and, for the subsequent decade, the proliferation
of state and local public campaign funding systems stalled.93
In the mid-1990s, however, elevated cynicism towards the role private
money played in politics delivered new support for adoption of state and local-
level public campaign funding schemes. 94 Today, twenty-three states and
fourteen municipalities provide for some form of campaign subsidy program.95
Among the states and municipalities that have enacted public campaign funding
over the past fifteen years, a handful-beginning with Maine in 1996-have
adopted a reform measure called "Clean Elections.
9 6
B. Clean Elections Programs
Clean Elections operate similarly to the system for public financing of
presidential general elections by calling for state and local governments to
provide participating candidates full public funding, which supporters have
nicknamed "Clean Money. 9 7 This Clean Money seeks to eradicate all but
small sums of private contributions from campaign fundraising to create "clean
elections."98 In general, the programs aspire to accomplish this purge by
dictating that a candidate who voluntarily agrees to accept public funds from a
state or municipality-which vary in amount by state and city, and by the
elected position sought-must in return forego virtually all private
92. See Jones, supra note 90, at 283 (presenting the justifications proffered for adoption
of state-level public financing systems).
93. MALBIN & GAIs, supra note 89, at 22.
94. Id.
95. Ctr. for Governmental Studies, MAPPING PuBLIc FINANCING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS
1, 2 (2009), available at http://www.cgs.org/images/publications/pfaemapfinal_2009.pdf.
96. Thomas E. Mann, Reform Agenda, in THE NEw CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 264,
266 (2005); see also Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, The
Maine Clean Elections Act, http://www.state.me.us/ethics/mcea/index.htm (last visited Sept. 29,
2009) (discussing the 1996 voter initiative that led to enactment of the Maine Clean Elections
Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
97. Mann, supra note 96, at 266; see also supra note 32 (discussing the presidential
election full public funding program as established by the Revenue Act of 1971).
98. See Mann, supra note 96, at 266 ("[C]hampions of full public financing seek to banish
all but nominal qualifying private contributions from election campaigns.... [The] approach is
similar to the full public financing program currently in place for presidential general
elections.").
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contributions to run her campaign, excluding small sums of "qualifying
contributions" and "seed money."
99
The popularity of Clean Elections is rising, largely pushed by increasing
grassroots efforts aimed at encouraging adoption of Clean Elections by state
and local legislatures.100  As of January 2009, seven states-Arizona,
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Mexico, North Carolina, and
Vermont-and two municipalities-Portland, Oregon, and Albuquerque, New
Mexico--have enacted Clean Elections. 101 In August 2008, California also
passed a Clean Elections bill that now awaits enactment through a scheduled
June 2010 voter initiative. 10 2 Additionally, in 2004, New Jersey launched a
Clean Elections pilot project in two legislative districts for the state's
November 2005 elections; the program's success led to the selection of three
more districts for the 2007 Fair and Clean Elections Pilot Project. 10 3 Congress,
too, has been considering Clean Elections legislation for congressional and
99. See, e.g., id. at 274 (explaining generally the operation of Clean Elections systems in
Maine and Arizona). The term "qualifying contributions" refers to mandated levels of small
private contributions, often ranging from $5 to $100, necessary to qualify for public funding
that operate as a means of proving a candidate's viability by showing sufficient citizen support
for her candidacy. See, e.g., Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices,
Qualifying Contributions, http://www.state.me.us/ethics/mcea/ qualify.htm (last visited Sept. 29,
2009) (explaining the operation and purpose of Maine's Clean Elections legislation's qualifying
contributions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The term "seed money"
refers to a limited permissible amount of private contributions that a candidate may raise to
sustain her campaign until it receives certification for the public grant. See, e.g., Mann, supra
note 96, at 274 (discussing the purpose of seed money in the Maine and Arizona Clean
Elections systems).
100. See, e.g., PublicCampaign.org Who We Are, http://www.publicampaign.org/about
(last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (discussing the organization's efforts to encourage state and local
adoption of Clean Elections laws) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Alaskans
for Clean Elections, http://www.alaskansforcleanelections.org (last visited Sept. 29, 2009)
(advocating Clean Elections in Alaska) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Citizens for Clean Elections in West Virginia, http://www.wvoter-owned.org (last visited F
Sept. 29, 2009) (advocating Clean Elections in West Virginia) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
101. See, e.g., The New Rules Project, http://www.newrules.org/gov/clean.html (last
visited Sept. 29, 2009) (enumerating and discussing the states that had enacted Clean Elections
laws through 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Aspects of Vermont's
scheme, however, were ruled unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. The
Massachusetts state legislature repealed that state's law in 2003. See Mann, supra note 96, at
274 (discussing the repeal of Massachusetts's Clean Elections law).
102. CalifomiaCleanMoneyCampaign.com, California Fair Elections Act to Appear on
June 8, 2010 Ballot!, http://www.caclean.org/progress/news.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
103. See New Jersey Legislature, http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/committees/njcleanelec.asp
(last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (discussing the New Jersey Clean Elections pilot projects) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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senatorial contests.'04 At the state level, the elected offices covered by Clean
Elections schemes vary. Arizona, Maine, and Connecticut, for instance,
provide full public funding for all statewide and legislative races, while North
Carolina and New Mexico subsidize state high-court judicial candidacies.1
0 5
C. Rescue Funds in Clean Elections
Clean Election systems' popularity has surged because indications exist
that suggest the programs "increase[] the pool of candidates willing and able to
run for state legislative office and increase[] the likelihood that an incumbent
[will] have a competitive race."'1 6 To enhance competition, Clean Elections
systems embrace an attribute foreign to the presidential election full public
funding system, but deemed vital to their success, 10 7 known as "rescue funds"
(or "matching funds") provisions. 18 In general, these stipulations entitle a
candidate participating in a Clean Elections program (participating candidate)
to receive an additional allowance of public money beyond her initial
subsidy. 09 The participating candidate's receipt of this money occurs when
some mixture of her nonparticipating opponent's (nonparticipating candidate)
campaign expenditures and IEs in support of her nonparticipating opponent or
104. See, e.g., Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1285, 110th Cong. § 501 (2007) (calling for
creation of a full voluntary system of public funding for Senate candidates that, like state Clean
Elections programs, would require a candidate to raise seed money and collect qualifying
contributions in order to become eligible for public funds).
105. See PublicCampaign.org, States/Localities with Clean Elections, http://www.
publicampaign.org/where (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (showing the states and municipalities
that have adopted Clean Elections and for which races public money is made available) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
106. Mann, supra note 96, at 274.
107. See McComish v. Brewer, No. 08-1550, 2008 WL 4629337, at *7 (D. Ariz. Oct. 21,
2008) (presenting a statement from Professor Kenneth Mayer, a political science professor at the
University of Wisconsin-Madison, declaring that "[rescue] fund provisions are crucial to the
success of clean elections programs" and citing evidence that only 15.3% of candidates
participate in Wisconsin's rescue fund-less public funding program); Green Party of Conn. v.
Garfield, 537 F. Supp. 2d 359, 391 n.67 (D. Conn. 2008) (suggesting that the absence of rescue
funds in a Clean Elections system "may have serious consequences" based on events in
Vermont, which has no rescue funds, where Howard Dean withdrew from a governor race
declaring he had "no way to keep up" with his nonparticipating opponent).
108. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1125(9) (2008) (referring to Maine's
rescue funds as "matching funds").
109. E.g., PublicCampaign.org How Clean Elections Works, http://www.publicampaign.
org/node/34047 (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (explaining generally how under a Clean Elections
system a rescue funds provision, when activated, provides an additional grant of public funds to
a participating candidate) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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in opposition to her candidacy (hostile IEs) exceeds the participating
candidate's agreed-to statutory spending limit."0 States enact Clean Elections
that include rescue funds primarily for the purpose of providing an additional
incentive to persuade candidate participation in the program."' The provisions
do this by ensuring that a high-spending, nonparticipating candidate (or hostile
IE-making group) does not greatly outspend her participating opponent." 2
This, in turn, equalizes political opportunity for a greater number of potential
election contestants." 3 Despite this admirable purpose, questions over rescue
funds' constitutionality have aroused a "hotbed of controversy" in the federal
circuit courts.' 
14
V. The Circuit Court Dispute over Rescue Funds' Constitutionality
Since Buckley, courts, "in considering the constitutionality of a host of
campaign finance statutes... ha[ve] adhered to Buckley's constraints,
110. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-952 (2008) (providing rescue funds to
candidates participating in Arizona's Clean Elections public financing scheme when their
nonparticipating opponents make campaign expenditures, including hostile IEs made against the
participating candidate, that exceed the amount of the original public subsidy given to the
participating candidate); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1125(9) (2008) (providing that a
participating candidate in Maine's Clean Elections program may receive rescue funds based on
her nonparticipating opponent's campaign contributions and expenditures, in conjunction with
hostile lEs in favor of the nonparticipating candidate, subject to limits based on the office
sought); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.67 (2008) (providing for aparticipatingjudicial candidate's
immediate receipt of rescue funds equal to the difference between her initial grant and the
greater of the amount raised or spent by her nonparticipating opponent, including hostile IEs,
subject to limits depending on whether it is a primary or general election). The Clean Elections
laws of Connecticut, New Mexico, and New Jersey have all provided for similar rescue funds
mechanisms. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN §§ 16-941(B)(2), 16-952 (2006); CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-
712,9-713,9-714 (Supp. 2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-19A-9(E), 1-19A-14 (2007).
111. MALBin & GAls, supra note 89, at 60 (indicating that rescue funds are one of several
"kinds of incentives [states use] to persuade candidates to do what the states want").
112. See, e.g., Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, Matching
Funds, http://www.state.me.us/ethics/mcea/index.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (expressing
Maine's rescue funds' purpose in preventing a participating candidate from being greatly
outspent by a nonparticipating candidate) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
113. See, e.g., Connecticut State Elections Enforcement Comm'n Overview of Citizens'
Election Program 1 (2008), available at http://www.ct.gov/seec/lib/seec/BasicRequirements_
for_2008_GeneralAssemblyCandidates2.pdf (stating Connecticut's Clean Elections
program's goal of providing candidates lacking access to sources of wealth a meaningful
opportunity to seek state elective office).




including" that expenditure limits violate the First Amendment.11 5 This
framework has provoked a slight conflict among the circuit courts as to whether
rescue funds serve as impermissible expenditure limits that implicate the First
Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause. 1 6  Only the Eighth Circuit, however, has found rescue funds
unconstitutional.
1 17
That result occurred in Day v. Holahan,'18 which considered a challenge
to a Minnesota statute that provided rescue funds to a publicly funded candidate
in response to hostile IEs.1 9  Under the challenged law, participating
candidates facing a hostile IE had their own expenditure limits increased by the
amount of that IE and received an additional public subsidy of one-half the IE's
value.120 By advocating via an IE campaign, therefore, "the individual or group
intending to contribute to [the] defeat [of a participating candidate became]
directly responsible for adding to [the participating candidate's] campaign
coffers. 12' To the Eighth Circuit, this anomaly presented a sufficient First
Amendment burden on a party intending to speak politically through an IE.122
This impairment arose because Buckley had made clear that lEs operate as
protected political speech.1 23 The Day court declared that because lEs serve as
guarded speech, Minnesota's statute imposed an indirect burden, or "chill," on
that protected speech of any person or group contemplating making an E.124
115. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230,232 (2006) (plurality opinion) (citing McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 134 (2003)).
116. See, e.g., N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake,
524 F.3d 427, 437 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, Duke v. Leake, 129 S. Ct. 490 (2008) (mem.)
(discussing the existence of a circuit split regarding whether rescue funds implicate the First
Amendment). The Supreme Court, in Gitlow v. New York, declared that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause's liberty protections include the First Amendment rights.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
117. Leake, 524 F.3d at 437 (indicating that the Eighth Circuit has been the only circuit
court to find a speech burden imposed by a rescue funds provision).
118. See Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1366 (8th Cir. 1994) (declaring unconstitutional
Minnesota statutes providing an increase in a political candidate's expenditure limit and public
subsidies based on levels of lEs, denying exemptions from prohibitions against IEs for nonprofit
corporations, and placing $ 100 limits on contributions to and from political action committees).
119. Id. at 1359-60.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1360.
122. See id. ("To the extent that a candidate's campaign is enhanced by the operation of the
statute, the political speech of the individual or group who made the [IE] 'against her' ... is
impaired.").
123. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing Buckley's ruling establishing
lEs as First Amendment-protected speech).
124. Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1360 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424
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This "chill" occurred because parties seeking to make an IE might choose not to
make the expenditure out of unease that the statute essentially would penalize
them by granting increased spending limits and a further public subsidy to the
very candidate they aimed to defeat. 125 Such potential self-censorship, the
Eighth Circuit ruled, "is no less a burden on speech that is susceptible to
constitutional challenge than is direct government censorship."'
26
Having found fundamental First Amendment rights burdened, the Eighth
Circuit applied strict scrutiny to determine whether the law had been "narrowly
drawn to serve a compelling state interest."'127 The government avowed that the
State's rescue funds sought to enhance public confidence in the political
process by ensuring the viability of the public funding system through a scheme
designed to encourage candidates to partake in public financing. 128 The court
confessed that this served as a "noble goal" but questioned its "compelling"
force in light of the First Amendment burden inflicted by the statute.1 29 Yet,
the court concluded that even if it deemed the State's interest compelling, that
interest nevertheless failed to justify the law because the public funding
program already received nearly 100% enrollment, and, therefore, did not
necessitate rescue funds to encourage participation.
30
Since Day, the First, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have also considered
rescue funds' constitutionality, but each has found them constitutional by either
rejecting Day's logic explicitly or ignoring it entirely.' 31 For instance, in 2000,
in Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices,
132
U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam)).
125. See id. (declaring that Minnesota's challenged rescue funds provisions burdened
speech "even before the state implement[ed] the statute's mandates" by promoting self-
censorship).
126. Id. (citing City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757-58
(1988)).
127. See id. at 1361 ("[T]he statute maybe upheld as against constitutional challenge if the
state can show that it is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.").
128. Id.
129. See id. ("[W]e are not certain it is a sufficiently 'compelling' interest to justify the
burden that the statute imposes upon speech.").
130. Id.
131. See Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 537 F. Supp. 2d 359, 391 (D. Conn. 2008)
(stating that all other courts to consider the issue of rescue funds' constitutionality have refused
to adopt Day's logic). In Green Party, the district court, in ruling on the constitutionality of
Connecticut's Clean Elections program's rescue funds, also rejected Day's reasoning and found
the rescue funds constitutional because they failed to burden speech. Id.
132. See Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445,
472 (1st Cir. 2000) (concluding that the Maine Clean Election Act's public financing scheme,
including its rescue funds, met constitutional scrutiny).
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the First Circuit considered Maine's Clean Elections rescue funds provision's
constitutionality. 133 Maine's scheme grants a participating candidate additional
money when her nonparticipating opponent's campaign contributions and
expenditures (in conjunction with LEs hostile to the participating candidate)
exceed the participating candidate's initial public funds.' 34 The First Circuit
declared that Maine's rescue funds do not restrict expenditures directly, which
would "inherently burden speech" under Buckley's framework.' 3 Nor, the
court determined, in opposition to Day, do they "chill" political speech
indirectly. 136 Instead, the First Circuit viewed the additional disbursement of
public money as simply providing the participating candidate an opportunity to
respond to hostile political speech. 137 Because Buckley held that the First
Amendment seeks to "secure the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources,' 38 the Daggett court explicitly refused
to adopt Day's logic equating responsive speech to a First Amendment
burden. 39 In contrast, the court declared that there exists "no right to speak
free from response. "140 Consequently, Daggett concluded that rescue funds
present no burden on political speech because they "in no way limit[] the
quantity of speech one can engage in or the amount of money one can spend
engaging in political speech, nor [do they] threaten censure or penalty for such
expenditures."'41
Having reached this conclusion, the First Circuit switched its focus away
from rescue funds' impact on speech and instead analyzed their general impact
on Maine's public funding scheme. 142 In so doing, the court adopted the logic
of an earlier First Circuit decision, Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano,143 and
133. Id. at 463-66, 468-72.
134. See supra note 110 (presenting Maine Clean Election Act's rescue funds scheme).
135. Daggett, 205 F.3d at 464.
136. See id. ("[T]he provision of [rescue] funds does not indirectly burden donors'
speech... rights.").
137. Id.
138. Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (per
curiam)).
139. See id. at 465 ("We cannot adopt the logic of Day, which equates responsive speech
with an impairment to the initial speaker.").
140. Id. at 464 (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 14
(1986) (plurality opinion)).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 468-72.
143. See Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 43 (Ist Cir. 1993) (finding
constitutional provisions of Rhode Island's amended campaign finance law providing
contribution cap gaps and free television time to publicly financed candidates, but declaring
unconstitutional a provision that created a disclosure threshold for political action committee
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upheld Maine's rescue funds provision.' 44 Vote Choice considered a challenge
to a Rhode Island statute that provided for a contribution "cap gap," which
raised a participating gubernatorial candidate's contribution limits when
triggered. 145 In Vote Choice, the First Circuit, based on the Buckley and RNC
standards for the presidential public funding system, focused entirely on the
voluntariness of Rhode Island's scheme and whether the "cap gap" coerced
candidate participation. 46 No coercion existed in Vote Choice because the
court found a "rough proportionality" between the benefits and burdens of
participating and not participating in the scheme. 47 Similarly, the Daggett
court focused on whether Maine's rescue funds impermissibly compelled
candidate participation in the Clean Elections system and determined they do
not. 14
8
Daggett also endorsed an additional Vote Choice standard. This second
principle, in contrast to the Day court's reluctance, unabashedly asserts that
states possess a compelling interest in encouraging candidates to opt into their
public financing systems "because such programs 'facilitate communication by
candidates with the electorate,' free candidates from the pressures of
fundraising, and, relatedly, tend to combat corruption." 49 Daggett, likewise,
determined that candidates would prove less likely to partake in Maine's public
contributors, compared to a different disclosure threshold for candidate contributors).
144. Daggett v. Comm'n on Govemmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445,
468-72 (1st Cir. 2000).
145. See Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 29-30 (discussing the Rhode Island statute and public
financing system for gubernatorial campaigns and the contribution cap gaps goal of promoting
participation in the system). Rhode Island typically limited a gubernatorial candidate to $1,000
contributions from individuals or political action committees; however, the "cap gap" measure,
when triggered, permitted a participating candidate to receive double this contribution limit. Id.
at 30, 38 n. 13.
146. Id. at 39 (declaring that "voluntariness has proven to be an important factor in judicial
ratification of government-sponsored campaign financing schemes" and that an incentive
program like the "cap gap" measure could become impermissibly coercive) (citing Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 95 (1976) (per curiam); Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280,
285-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (three-judge court), a ffdmem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980)).
147. Id.
148. See Daggett, 205 F.3d at 472 (declaring Maine's rescue funds non-coercive because
they appeared to be a "hardly overwhelming" incentive and because there was a rough
proportionality of benefits and burdens between participating and not participating in public
funding).
149. Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 39 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Buckley, 424
U.S. at 91). But see supra note 129 and accompanying text (presenting a discussion of the Day




funding program absent rescue funds and suggested that the state possesses
an interest in encouraging such participation by offering the incentive.
50
The Fourth Circuit, in North Carolina Right to Life Committee Fund
for Independent Political Expenditures v. Leake (Leake),1'5 considered a
challenge to the rescue funds provision of North Carolina's judicial Clean
Elections statute. 152 The case's plaintiffs, utilizing Day's logic, argued that
the rescue funds "chill" and "penalize" speech. 153 The Fourth Circuit,
however, did not agree, and called Day an "anomaly."' 154 Instead, like the
First Circuit in Daggett, the Leake court explicitly rejected as
"unpersuasive" Day's logic equating the potential self-censorship spurred
by a rescue funds system with direct government restriction. 155 Quoting
Daggett, Leake declared that the First Amendment does not give a
candidate, or an IE-making party, "a 'right to outraise and outspend an
opponent' nor a 'right to speak free from response.'" 1 56 Consequently, the
Fourth Circuit found that North Carolina's rescue funds impose no First
Amendment burden on nonparticipating candidates (or IE-making groups)
because they "remain free to raise and spend as much money, and engage in
as much political speech, as they desire."157 Deterrence, if any, of speech,
according to Leake, results from the "strategic, political choice" not to
activate the rescue funds trigger, and "not from a threat of government
150. See Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445,
469 (1st Cir. 2000) (suggesting that the state has an interest in ensuring participation in its
public funding system based on declaration that, in a system without rescue funds, "candidates
would be much less likely to participate").
151. See N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524
F.3d 427, 441 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, Duke v. Leake, 129 S. Ct. 490 (2008) (mem.)
(declaring constitutional North Carolina's granting of rescue funds in its public financing
program for state-high court judicial campaigns).
152. Id. at 436-38; see also supra note 110 (presenting North Carolina's rescue funds
provision).
153. Leake, 524 F.3d at 437.
154. Id. at 438.
155. See id. at 437-38 (discussing circuit conflict created by Day, but rejecting Day's
rationale).
156. Id. at 438-39 (quoting Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election
Practices, 205 F.3d 445,464 (1 st Cir. 2000)); see also Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 537 F.
Supp. 2d 359, 391 (D. Conn. 2008) (rejecting Day's logic and finding Connecticut's Clean
Elections program's rescue funds constitutional because "[a]n individual or candidate may
decide, as a strategic matter, not to speak as a result of the campaign financing system, but he is
in no way prohibited from exercising his right to free speech").
157. N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d
427, 437 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, Duke v. Leake, 129 S. Ct. 490 (2008) (mem.).
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censure or prosecution."15 8 Further, the Leake court, like the First Circuit
in Daggett, adopted Vote Choice's standard and ruled that North Carolina's
rescue funds do not improperly coerce candidate participation in the state's
public funding system. 5 9
Finally, in Gable v. Patton'60-a case decided prior to Daggett and
Leake-the Sixth Circuit upheld a Kentucky rescue funds provision.16' The
Kentucky law at issue placed limits on "slates" of same-party candidates for
Governor and Lieutenant Governor that participated in the state's public
campaign financing scheme.162 Once a nonparticipating slate collected
campaign funds, including contributions of their own money, in excess of
$1.8 million, the law permitted the participating slate to raise unlimited
private contributions, which became subject to a two-for-one public fund
match. 163 In assessing the constitutionality of this scheme, the Sixth Circuit
notably ignored Day's logic entirely.' 64 Instead, the court used Vote
Choice's framework exclusively to determine that the rescue funds
provisions did not impermissibly compel participation in Kentucky's public
funding system. 65 Gable, similar to Vote Choice and Daggett, also found
that, even if the program pressured participation, Kentucky had a
compelling interest because "a voluntary campaign finance scheme must
rely on incentives for participation, which ... means structuring the
scheme so that participation is usually the rational choice."'
66
158. Id. at 438.
159. Id. at 437 (citing Daggett, 205 F.3d at 466-72).
160. See Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940, 953 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding constitutional a
Kentucky campaign finance law rescue funds provision, sponsor identification provision,
candidate slating requirement, and twenty-eight day contribution window with respect to
external contributions, but finding unconstitutional the twenty-eight day window when applied
to personal contributions of a nonparticipating candidate to her own campaign).
161. Id. at 949.
162. Id. at 944.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake,
524 F.3d 427,437 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, Duke v. Leake, 129 S. Ct. 490 (2008) (mem.)
(describing Gable as "upholding a [rescue funds] scheme against a constitutional challenge
without addressing the Day analysis") (citing Gable, 142 F.3d at 947-49).
165. Gable, 142 F.3d at 949 (stating that no clear demarcation existed to suggest that
Kentucky's rescue funds provision acted more coercively than any of the other public financing
incentive schemes that have been held constitutional).
166. Id.; see also supra note 149 (juxtaposing the Vote Choice logic, adopted by Daggett
and Gable, that there exists a compelling state interest in encouraging public funding system
participation, and the Day court's asserted apprehension to deem such an interest "compelling").
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VI. Davis v. FEC: A New Standard?
Into this mix of circuit decisions came the June 2008 Supreme Court
Davis v. FEC ruling.167 Davis did not involve a challenge to a rescue funds
provision. The opinion, which nevertheless proves highly pertinent to the
rescue funds issue, 168 instead, pondered the constitutionality of the
"Millionaire's Amendment" of BCRA.1
69
A. BCRA and the Millionaire's Amendment
For years after Buckley, FECA's remaining provisions functioned
smoothly. 70  By the 1990s, however, FECA's regulatory scheme began
decaying as campaigns started relying on "soft money"-funds spent by
corporate, labor union, and individual contributors to pay for nonfederal
activities, such as advertising, not "expressly advocating" the election or defeat
of a candidate 7 '-on which FECA placed no limits. 72 As a result, the amount
of money unregulated by FECA during the 1996 presidential election nearly
equaled the regulated sum. 17 3 In response to soft money's perceived deleterious
effect, Congress enacted BCRA with two primary aims: first, "to restore
meaningful contribution limits (as well as spending limits for publicly funded
presidential campaigns) by prohibiting the unlimited soft money for national
political parties that... had become end runs around [FECA]," and second, "to
bring back corporate and labor spending restrictions, as well as disclosure, to
electioneering speech by all persons other than candidates and parties."' 74
167. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (introducing the Supreme Court's Davis
decision).
168. See McComish v. Brewer, No. 08-1550, 2008 WL 4629337, at *5 (D. Ariz. Oct. 21,
2008) (calling Davis "highly relevant to the question of [rescue] funds").
169. See infra notes 176-88 and accompanying text (presenting the Millionaire's
Amendment in detail and providing excerpts from the statute's text).
170. See Malbin, supra note 7, at 5 (declaring that virtually all campaign spending up
through the 1980 and 1984 presidential elections fell within FECA's boundaries).
171. See id. at 6 (defining the term "soft money").
172. See id. (stating that prior to BCRA, "if an advertisement did not contain words of
express advocacy, a corporation or labor union could spend unlimited amounts to pay for the ad,
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As part of BCRA, Congress amended FECA's provisions governing
contributions to candidates."7 5 BCRA, for instance, raised the 1974 FECA
amendments' individual contributions ceiling from $1,000 to $2,300 per two-
year election cycle, as well as the aggregate contribution limit that an
individual could give to all candidates and their authorized committees.
176
BCRA also provided limits on the coordinated expenditures a candidate
could accept from national and state political party committees. 177 Certain
Senate and House candidates, however, garnered permissible flexibility in
abiding by these limits via BCRA §§ 304 and 319, respectively. 178 These two
regulations, collectively dubbed the "Millionaire's Amendment," addressed
the issue of wealthy candidates supporting their own campaigns with
substantial personal funds.' 79  The Millionaire's Amendment aimed to
"attack[] the rich candidate problem... [by] making it easier for self-
financers' opponents to raise money.'18° In other words, much like rescue
funds, the scheme intended to level political opportunities for candidates of
varying wealth by creating an equal playing field.' 8 ' It accomplished this by
relaxing the campaign contribution limits for non-self-financing House and
Senate candidates (non-self-financing candidates) facing self-financing
opponents who spent personal funds beyond a certain threshold (self-
financing candidates). 8 2 The alternative contribution scheme activated when
a statistic, termed the "opposition personal funds amount" (OPFA), exceeded
a "trigger" amount of $350,000 because of the self-financing candidate's
expenditure of personal funds. 8 3 In general, the OPFA calculation depended
175. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing FECA's contribution limits).
176. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2765-66 (2008).
177. Malbin, supra note 7, at 7.
178. See id. at 14 (describing how the provisions that comprised the Millionaire's
Amendment permitted House and Senate candidates higher contribution limits under certain
circumstances).
179. Jennifer A. Steen, Self-Financed Candidates and the "Millionaires 'Amendment," in
THE ELECTION AFTER REFoRM: MONEY, PoLncs, AND THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM AcT,
204,204 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 2006).
180. Id.
181. Compare id. at 206 (discussing the Millionaire's Amendment's equitable purpose and
presenting a quote from the provision's legislative history declaring that the Millionaire's
Amendment would "even[] the playing field for candidates who are challenging millionaires or
who are challenged by millionaires") (citations omitted), with supra notes 112-14 and
accompanying text (discussing rescue funds' purpose of leveling electoral opportunities for
candidates of varying wealth).
182. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759,2765-66 (2008).
183. Id. at 2766. See2 U.S.C.A. §§ 441a-l(a)(l)(A)-(B) (West 2002). The statute stated:
[I]f the opposition personal funds amount with respect to a candidate for election to
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on an FEC-devised formula that took the difference between a self-financing
candidate's personal expenditures and her non-self-financing opponent's
personal expenditures, offset by any fundraising advantage that the non-self-
financing candidate may have enjoyed over the self-financing opponent.'1
4
Once the self-financing candidate's expenditure of personal funds drove the
OPFA over $350,000, the new asymmetrical contribution and expenditure
regulatory scheme took effect. 8 5 Under this alternative scheme, the self-
financing candidate remained subject to the ordinary limits. 8 6 Her non-self-
financing opponent, however, could receive contributions from individual
donors treble the usual $2,300 maximum ($6,900) and from individuals who
had already met the ordinary aggregate campaign contribution ceiling and
could make unlimited coordinated party expenditures. 8 7 Once the non-self-
financing candidate's receipts exceeded the OPFA, she again became subject
to the original limits.1
88
the office of Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the
Congress exceeds $350,000[:] (A) the [$2,300 individual contribution limit] with
respect to the candidate shall be tripled; (B) the [aggregate contribution limit] shall
not apply with respect to any contribution made with respect to the candidate if the
contribution is made under the increased limit allowed under paragraph (A) during
a period in which a candidate may accept such a contribution; and the
limits... with respect to any expenditure by a State or national committee of a
political party on behalf of the candidate shall not apply.
Id.
184. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2766. See 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 441a-I(a)(2)(A)-(B) (West2002). The
statute read:
(A) The opposition personal funds amount is an amount equal to the excess (if any)
of[:] (i) the greatest aggregate amount of expenditures from personal funds. . . that
an opposing candidate in the same election makes; over (ii) the aggregate amount
of expenditures from personal funds made by the candidate with respect to the
election.... (B)(i) For purposes of determining the aggregate amount of
expenditures from personal funds under subparagraph (A), such amount shall
include the gross receipts advantage of the candidate's authorized committee.
Id. The OPFA calculation for each candidate involved adding 50% of the funds raised for the
current election-measured periodically throughout the year preceding the election-to the
candidate's personal fund expenditures. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2766 n.5. The asymmetrical limits
took effect if a $350,000 or greater difference existed between the opponents' totals. Id.
185. § 441a-l(a)(l)(A);supra note 183.
186. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2766.
187. Id. (citing § 441a-l(a)(l)(A)); supra note 183.
188. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2766 (2008) (citing 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a-1 (a)(3) (West
2002)).
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B. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia Upholds
the Millionaire's Amendment Against a First Amendment Challenge
The Millionaire's Amendment's constitutionality came into question,
however, when Jack Davis, a 2004 and 2006 Democratic House candidate from
Buffalo, New York, challenged BCRA § 319 (the Millionaire's Amendment
pertaining to House elections) as violative of his First Amendment rights.
Davis, who lost both elections to the Republican incumbent, funded each
campaign mainly with his own money.1 9 In contrast, Davis's opponent spent
no personal funds on the 2006 campaign.' 90 When Davis decided to run in
2006, he declared his intentions to spend $1 million in personal funds, and
therefore to surpass the OPFA triggering limit.' 91 Foreseeing the § 319
consequences of his expenditures, Davis sued the FEC in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia seeking to have the Millionaire's
Amendment deemed unconstitutional and the FEC enjoined from enforcing the
regulation during the 2006 election.' 
92
In the subsequent litigation, Davis argued that the Millionaire's
Amendment burdened his First Amendment right, established in Buckley, to
make unlimited personal expenditures. Davis claimed that, because personal
spending caused the OPFA imbalance that permitted his opponent to raise
additional money to finance responsive speech, the Millionaire's Amendment
chilled his political speech by diminishing its effectiveness.' 93 A three judge
panel of the district court, however-citing heavily to Daggett, Gable, and Vote
Choice-rejected this argument. 94 The court determined that, like the public
funding schemes utilizing rescue funds at issue in Daggett and Gable, the
Millionaire's Amendment did "not limit in any way the use of a candidate's
personal wealth in [her] run for office. Instead, it provide[d] a benefit to [her]
opponent, thereby correcting a potential imbalance in resources available to
each candidate."'195 Simply providing a benefit did not indicate to the district




192. Id. at 2767-68.
193. See id. at 2770 (presenting Davis's First Amendment argument in opposition to the
Millionaire's Amendment).
194. See Davis v. FEC, 501 F. Supp. 2d 22, 29-31 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing heavily to
Daggett and Gable, as well as Vote Choice, for support in concluding that the Millionaire's
Amendment did not burden speech), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008).
195. Id. at 29 (citing Dagget v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices,
205 F.3d 445, 464-65 (st Cir. 2000); Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940, 948 (6th Cir. 1998)).
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court that the self-financing candidate's "speech would be impermissibly
chilled."'196 Also, based on Vote Choice's reasoning, the court declared the
Millionaire's Amendment a permissible, non-coercive imposition. In other
words, it did not impermissibly compel candidates into choosing not to self-
finance because "whether a candidate incur[red] the burdens and benefits of the
Amendment [was] entirely [her] option, and a statute whose application turns
on such a choice does not impose an unconstitutional burden on First
Amendment rights."'197 Consequently, the district court granted the FEC
summary judgment, and Davis appealed directly to the Supreme Court, as
BCRA permitted. 198
C. The Supreme Court Reverses and Declares the Millionaire's Amendment
a First Amendment Violation
1. Davis's First Amendment Burden Analysis
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision penned by Justice Alito, reversed
the lower court. 199 The Court, in dicta, concluded that Davis would have had
no basis to challenge § 319's constitutionality if the provision had simply raised
the contribution limits for all candidates. 20 0 The law, however, exclusively
raised limits for the non-self-financing candidate and only when her self-
financing opponent exceeded the OPFA threshold.20 1 As a result of this
asymmetrical scheme, the Court declared that it had "never upheld the
constitutionality of a law that imposes different contribution limits for
candidates who are competing against each other," and that the "scheme
impermissibly burden[ed Davis's] First Amendment right to spend his own
money for campaign speech.,
20 2
To reach this conclusion, the Davis Court emphasized Buckley's
conclusion that there exists a fundamental right to use personal funds for
196. Id. at 30 ("Davis must demonstrate that a self-financed candidate's speech would be
impermissibly chilled, not simply that his opponent would gain some benefit.").
197. Id. at 31 (citing Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 39 (1st Cir. 1993)).
198. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2768 (2008).
199. Id. at 2775.
200. See id. at 2771 (declaring that Davis would have had no constitutional challenge had
Section 319 merely raised the contribution limits for all candidates because the constitution
imposes no duty on Congress to enact campaign contribution limits and, if Congress found no
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campaign speech.2°3 Although § 319 did not subject a self-financing candidate
to an expenditure limit, Davis found it nonetheless imposed an "unprecedented
penalty" on First Amendment-protected speech.204  The Court cited Day
approvingly, ignoring the contrasting circuit opinions relied on by the district
court,20 5 to conclude that § 319 burdened the self-financing candidate's right to
spend limitlessly on political speech. 206 The Davis Court found this burden
because, it concluded, if a self-financing candidate opted to make unlimited
expenditures, she would shoulder the "special and potentially significant
burden" inflicted by § 319's asymmetrical contribution limits. 20 7  These
disparate limits, the Court declared, penalized the self-financing candidate's
speech by creating a fundraising advantage for her opponent in the competitive
world of political elections.208
It also did not matter that the self-financing candidate could choose
whether or not to suffer the First Amendment "drag" of benefiting her
opponent. 209 The choice a self-financing candidate confronted under the
Millionaire's Amendment, the Davis Court asserted, inherently differed from
the expenditure limit conditions imposed on a publicly funded candidate upheld
in Buckley.210 To the contrary, Buckley involved a "quite different" choice
because a candidate opting not to receive public funding retained an "unfettered
right to make unlimited personal expenditures. 2 11 Section 319, however,
ensured restriction on that right.212 It did so by imposing on the self-financing
candidate exclusively a choice between personal spending restraints: Either
203. See id. (calling Buckley's emphasis on the fundamental nature of the right to spend
personal funds for campaign speech "instructive").
204. See id. at 2771 ("While BCRA does not impose a cap on a candidate's expenditure of
personal funds, it imposes an unprecedented penalty on any candidate who robustly exercises
that First Amendment right.").
205. Supra note 194.
206. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759,2772 (2008) (citing Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356,
1359-60 (8th Cir. 1994)).
207. Id.
208. Id. ("Under [Section] 319[], the vigorous exercise of the right to use personal funds to
finance campaign speech produces fundraising advantages for opponents in the competitive
context of electoral politics.") (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475
U.S. 1, 14 (1986)).
209. See id. (declaring that a First Amendment restraint "is not constitutional simply
because it attaches as a consequence of a statutorily imposed choice"). Contra supra note 197.
210. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at2772.
211. Id.
212. See id. (concluding that Section "319[] does not provide anyway in which a candidate




bear a self-imposed limit placed on personal expenditures or endure the burden
placed on that right by the prompting of the disparate contribution limits.
213
2. Davis's Strict Scrutiny Review
"Because § 319[] impose[d] a substantial burden on the exercise of the
First Amendment right to use personal funds for campaign speech, th[e]
provision [could] not stand unless it [was] justified by a compelling state
interest." 214 The Government, however, failed to proffer such a justification.
Because the Buckley Court found that reliance on personal funds reduces the
potential for corruption, the Davis Court ruled that § 319 undermined
215anticorruption interests. More significantly, Davis deemed illegitimate the
Government's averred secondary interest in "level[ing] electoral opportunities
for candidates of different personal wealth" via reduction of the "natural
advantage that wealthy individuals possess in campaigns for federal office.,
216
The Davis Court rejected this claimed interest because the Court's campaign
finance precedents, including Buckley, indicated that thwarting corruption, or
apparent corruption, served as the "only... government interests thus far
identified for restricting campaign finances. 2 17 The Davis Court added that
campaign finance restrictions aimed at leveling electoral opportunities
presented "ominous implications. 2 18 Such ajustification, declared the Court,
would grant Congress domain over voters' determinations of a candidate's
qualifications by making Congress the judge of which strengths of a candidate
should influence an election. 219 Because "[d]ifferent candidates have different
strengths," including wealth, Congress would gain too much leverage in
determining election outcomes.220 The Court would not accept this
213. Id.
214. Id. (citations omitted).
215. See id. at 2773 (declaring that the Millionaire's Amendment, "by discouraging use of
personal funds, disserves the anticorruption interest").
216. Id. (quoting Brief for Appellee at 33, Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008) (No. 07-
320)); see also supra notes 181-82 (discussing the Millionaire's Amendment's "leveling the
playing field" purpose).
217. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2773 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,
428 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting)); cf supra notes 74-77 (presenting Buckley's rejection of
the equalizing of financial resources interest).
218. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2773.
219. Id. at 2773-74.
220. Id. at 2774.
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possibility.22' Thus, because the Millionaire's Amendment lacked a compelling
interest justifying the First Amendment drag it imposed through its
"unprecedented[ly] penal[]" asymmetrical contribution limits, the law failed to
pass constitutional muster.
222
VII. How Does Davis Bear on the Assessment of Rescue Funds'
Constitutionality?
Since Davis, critical interpretations have varied regarding the ruling's
impact on the constitutionality of the rescue funds provisions employed by
Clean Elections programs. Some pundits argue that Davis makes tenuous
rescue funds' viability.223 Professor Richard L. Hasen of Loyola Law School
Los Angeles, for example, in a Davis critique posted on his Election Law Blog
the day of the decision, described the ruling as "calling [the use of] all [rescue
funds] provisions in public financing systems into question. ''224  Other
commentators, however, depict such accounts as "overblown, ' 225 and, instead,
avow that Davis's reasoning does not signal rescue funds'
unconstitutionality.
226
The courts, too, have begun weighing in on the issue, but with little
resolution thus far. In October 2008, the District Court for the District of
Arizona, ruling on a motion for preliminary injunction, concluded that Davis
likely indicates that Arizona's Clean Elections Act's rescue funds violate the
221. Id.
222. Id. at 2775.
223. See Eliza Newlin Carney, Campaign Finance Laws Under Siege, NAT'L J., July 28,
2008, http://www.nationaljoumal.com/njonline/rg_20080728_5842.php (last visited Sept. 29,
2009) (declaring that some political scientists believe that Davis threatens the viability of state
public finance rules, including rescue funds schemes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
224. Posting of Rick Hasen at Election Law Blog, http://election
lawblog.org/archives/01 1095.html (June 26, 2008,07:55 AM PDT) (last visited Sept. 29,2009)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
225. See Posting of Paul S. Ryan at Campaign Legal Center Blog, http://www.clcblog.org/
blogitem-239.html (July 23, 2008) (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (claiming that media accounts
have "overblown" Davis's negative impact on rescue funds) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
226. See, e.g., Posting of Bob Bauer at More Money Hard Law Web Updates, http://www.
moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/news.html?AID=1295 (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (stating that
Davis finding the Millionaire's Amendment unconstitutional does not compel a similar
judgment with regards to rescue funds provisions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law




227First Amendment. Yet, in January 2009, despite anticipations of at least a
grant, vacate, and remand order in light of Davis,228 the Supreme Court denied,
without comment, a certiorari petition to hear an appeal to the Fourth Circuit's
Leake decision.229 Davis's impact on the long-debated question of rescue
funds' constitutionality, therefore, remains muddled. Much needed clarity,
however, arises in the following discussion. To deliver this result, the
proceeding analysis scrutinizes whether, in light of Davis, rescue funds
provisions burden fundamental First Amendment rights and, in so concluding,
whether they can survive strict scrutiny.
A. Burden Analysis
To recap, over the past fifteen years, the issue of rescue funds'
constitutionality has centered on whether they impermissibly burden First
Amendment rights. Two competing views have evolved in the circuit courts.23°
Rescue funds' critics have embraced the minority position that surfaced
exclusively in the Eighth Circuit's Day decision.231 This stance claims that
rescue funds operate as unconstitutional expenditure limits that "chill" free
expression by causing a nonparticipating candidate's (or IE-making group's)
self-censorship and, thus, function as "no less a burden on
speech... than... direct government censorship. 2 32  Rescue funds'
supporters (supporters), in contrast, have endorsed the majority view-adopted
by the First, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits-that suggests that rescue funds, by
227. See McComish v. Brewer, No. 08-1550,2008 WL 4629337, at *12 (D. Ariz. Oct. 21,
2008) (denying plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction but concluding that plaintiffs had
shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that, in light of Davis,
Arizona's rescue funds violated the First Amendment); see also supra note 110 (presenting
Arizona's rescue funds scheme).
228. See, e.g., Posting of Rick Hasen at Election Law Blog, http://electionlawblog.org/
archives/012061.html (Oct. 27, 2008, 20:29 PM PST) (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) ("I think a
GVR of the cert. petition in light of Davis... is a real possibility.") (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
229. N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d
427, 441 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, Duke v. Leake, 129 S. Ct. 490 (2008) (mem.); see supra
notes 151-59 (presenting the Fourth Circuit's decision in Leake upholding the constitutionality
of North Carolina's rescue funds scheme).
230. See supra Part V (presenting the circuit court split over, and the alternative stances the
circuits have taken regarding, whether rescue funds impose a burden on fundamental First
Amendment rights).
231. See supra notes 118-30 and accompanying text (discussing the Eighth Circuit's ruling
in Day).
232. Supra note 126 and accompanying text.
1297
66 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1265 (2009)
simply aiding responsive speech, do not impose an expenditure limit-like
freedom of expression burden on nonparticipating candidates (or IE-making
groups).233 This stance avows that no speech burden results because there is
"no right to speak free from response 2 34 and because nonparticipating
candidates (and IE-making groups) "remain free to raise and spend as much
money, and engage in as much political speech, as they desire. ' 235 Pursuant to
this majority standard, the focus then shifts to whether the rescue funds benefit
proves so exceptional that it makes the state's public campaign subsidy system
unconstitutionally involuntary by coercing participation-no court has yet
found this to be the case.236 Courts now must reconcile whether Davis affects
this apparent authority split.
1. Davis Undermines the Prevailing Arguments that Rescue Funds Do Not
Burden a Nonparticipating Candidate 's Speech
Supporters aver that Davis fails to apply to the rescue funds issue due to
the persistence of the majority view that responsive speech does not equate to
237an abridgement of the initial speaker's freedom of expression. According to
supporters, there exists a "crucial [jurisprudential] First Amendment distinction
between government restrictions on speech and government subsidies of
speech. " 238  The Davis Court, they allege, mindful of these differences,
remained "careful not to say that any policy measure that arguably gives one
candidate more speech power" necessarily burdens the speech of an
opponent.239 Supporters suggest that the opinion instead stood for the
proposition that a law abridges freedom of expression only when it imposes a
"direct restriction" on a candidate's speech based on that candidate's decision
to exercise her First Amendment rights.240 On the other hand, supporters claim
233. See supra notes 131-66 and accompanying text (presenting the circuit courts'
majority view that rescue funds do not burden First Amendment rights).
234. Supra notes 140, 156.
235. Supra note 157.
236. See supra notes 146-48, 159, 165 and accompanying text (presenting Daggett's,
Leake's, and Gable's analysis of whether the availability of rescue funds coerces candidates to
participate in public funding).
237. Infra note 247 and accompanying text.
238. The Supreme Court, 2007 Term-Leading Cases, 122 HARv. L. REv. 375, 381, 383
[hereinafter Harvard 2007 Term Cases].
239. Id. at 383.
240. See id. ("[Davis] merely reasoned that restricting a candidate's speech based on an
opponent's decision to exercise his speech rights is an unconstitutional burden.").
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that, because the Buckley Court declared that the First Amendment aims to
"secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources,, 24' freedom of expression remains unburdened when a
law simply promotes one candidate's speech based on her opponent's exercise
of his speech rights.242 Thus, supporters suggest that, "[w]hile both kinds of
regulation seek to level the field between candidates, only [direct restrictions
do] so by affirmatively limiting a candidate's First Amendment right to
speak.
2 43
Due to this alleged distinction, supporters claim that a "clear doctrinal
line" exists between the public funding schemes that utilize rescue funds and
the disparate private fundraising contribution restrictions at issue in Davis.
244
They contend that the Millionaire's Amendment's asymmetrical contribution
limitations impermissibly restricted a self-financing candidate's speech by
subjecting her to lower limits simply because she chose to exercise her freedom
of expression rights. 245 This direct restriction, supporters aver, burdened
speech and caused the Court to apply expenditure limit standards to its analysis
of the Millionaire's Amendment.246 In contrast, supporters claim that rescue
funds impose no speech restraint because, as Daggett established, there exists
no right to speak free from response. 247 "By providing additional funding to
[participating] candidates," supporters declare, rescue funds "only promote
speech [and] in no way do they directly restrict" the speech of the
nonparticipating candidate.248 Supporters contend, therefore, that Davis does
nothing to undermine Daggett's and Leake' s refusal to apply expenditure limit
standards to rescue funds cases as rescue funds simply promote "the widest
241. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
242. Harvard 2007 Term Cases, supra note 238, at 383.
243. Id.
244. See id. at 384.
245. Id.; see also Response in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11, Duke v.
Leake, 129 S. Ct. 490 (2008) (No. 08-120) ("[Tlhe discriminatory treatment that concerned the
Court in Davis related to contribution limits in the context of private fundraising. There is no
question under the governing precedent that contribution limits impose burdens on First
Amendment rights .... ").
246. Harvard 2007 Term Cases, supra note 238, at 384.
247. See supra notes 140, 156, 234 and accompanying text (presenting the argument that
there exists no right to speak free from response).
248. Harvard 2007 Term Cases, supra note 238, at 384; see also Response in Opposition
to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 245, at 12 (discussing how the legal context in
Davis restricted speech while rescue funds, as part of a public funding scheme, fulfill the First
Amendment's purpose of facilitating and enlarging speech) (citations omitted).
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possible dissemination" of speech by providing the participating candidate the
means to respond to her nonparticipating opponent (or to a hostile IE).
249
Davis, however, calls into question the existence of the averred "crucial
First Amendment distinction" between speech subsidies and speech restrictions.
First, Davis usurps the contention that there exists no right to speak free from
(state-aided) response. 250  The Court did so when it concluded that the
Millionaire's Amendment impermissibly produced fundraising advantages for
political opponents.
As discussed, the notion that candidates (and IE-making groups) have "no
right to speak free from response" arose in Daggett.25' The First Circuit in
Daggett established this premise by citing to Pacific Gas & Electric Company
v. Public Utilities Commission,252 a First Amendment decision not involving
campaign finance.253 The Daggett court characterized Pacific Gas as standing
only for the proposition that "there exists no right to speak 'free from vigorous
debate.' 2 5 4  The Davis Court, however, in finding that the Millionaire's
Amendment unfairly created "fundraising advantages for opponents in the
competitive context of electoral politics," also cited Pacific Gas, but for a
converse principle. The Davis Court remarked that Pacific Gas discovered
"infringement of speech rights where if the plaintiff spoke it could be
forced... to help disseminate hostile views."255 Further, the Davis-Court-
endorsed portion of Pacific Gas expounds that, although one does not have the
"right to be free from vigorous debate," she "does have the right to be free from
government restrictions that abridge [her] own rights in order to enhance the
relative voice of [her] opponent[]. 25 6 Davis, thus, stands in opposition to
249. See Harvard 2007 Term Cases, supra note 238, at 384 (declaring that Daggett and its
progeny have recognized the crucial distinction between penalties and subsidies, and that this
has led these circuit courts to refuse to apply expenditure limit standards when assessing rescue
funds' constitutionality); see also Response in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 245, at 12 (discussing how the legal context in Davis restricted speech while rescue
funds, as part of a public funding scheme, fulfill the First Amendment's purpose of facilitating
and enlarging speech).
250. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (presenting this position of supporters).
251. Supra note 140 and accompanying text.
252. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (concluding that the California Public Utilities Commission burdened a
utility company's First Amendment rights by ordering the utility to place a newsletter of a third-
party in its billing envelopes and that the order was not justified by a compelling state interest).
253. See generally id.
254. Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445,464
(1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Pac. Gas, 475 U.S. at 14).
255. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2772 (2008) (quoting Pac. Gas, 475 U.S. at 14).
256. Pac. Gas, 475 U.S. at 14 (internal citations omitted); see also McComish v. Brewer,
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Daggett and its progeny because it denotes that, in fact, a right to speak free
from response does exist. This constitutional protection, however, only arises
when the government places a "restriction" on the initial candidate-speaker that
"abridges" that initial speaker's First Amendment rights in order to amplify the
voice of her opponent. With this principle established, it proves necessary to
determine whether supporters correctly assert that only "direct" government
restrictions abridge political speech, as rescue funds have been classified only
as indirect burdens on speech.257
The deeming of rescue funds as an indirect burden on candidate (or IE)
speech, of course, solely arose in Day,258 and the Davis Court explicitly
endorsed Day.2 59 In so doing, Davis calls into question supporters' stance that
direct government restrictions on speech, alone, implicate the First
Amendment.26°
No. 08-1550, 2008 WL 4629337, at *6 (D. Ariz. Oct. 21, 2008) (addressing how the Davis
Court's approval of this language signals that the Court was focused on more than just the direct
penalty that resulted from the Millionaire's Amendment's imposed asymmetrical contribution
limits). The Davis Court's endorsement of this logic in the campaign finance realm hardly
comes as a surprise. The stance appears as a corollary to Buckley's declaration that "the concept
that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." Supra note 77 and
accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 124-26 (presenting Day's indirect First Amendment burden analysis).
258. Supra notes 124-26.
259. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text (mentioning that the Davis Court
cited Day with approval). The Davis Court's endorsement of Day largely goes unmentioned by
supporters when they formulate their arguments in support of why rescue funds do not burden
speech. See, e.g., Response in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 245
(presenting arguments for why rescue funds do not burden speech, notwithstanding Davis,
without addressing the Court's approval of Day); Harvard 2007 Term Cases, supra note 238
(same); Ryan, supra note 225 (same). In the Harvard piece, for example, the author asserts that
circuit courts have refused to apply expenditure limit precedent when analyzing the efficacy of
rescue funds. Supra note 249 and accompanying text. The argument that circuit courts, such as
the First Circuit in Daggett, have refused to find the existence of a burden in rescue funds cases
comes with one significant qualifier-Day--the very, and only, one of these circuit decisions
the Davis Court endorsed in finding the Millionaire's Amendment unconstitutional. Supra
notes 205-06 and accompanying text. The Harvard piece, however, chooses not to address this
endorsement. See generally Harvard 2007 Term Cases, supra note 238.
260. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 224 (exclaiming that the Court's endorsement of Day
proves indicative of Davis's threat to rescue funds); see also Letter from Albert Porroni,
Legislative Counsel, New Jersey State Legislature Office of Legislative Services, to William
Castner, Executive Director, New Jersey Assembly Democratic Office (July 21, 2008),
http://www.campaignfreedom.org/docLib/20080725 NJ davis.pdf(last visited Sept. 29,2009)
(expressing the sentiment that the Court's endorsement of Day is "noteworthy" and indicates
that a court would likely declare New Jersey's rescue funds provision unconstitutional) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Again, only Day has "equat[ed] responsive speech with an impairment to
the initial speaker."261 The Eighth Circuit found that, "[t]o the extent.., a
candidate's campaign is enhanced by the operation of [a rescue funds] statute,
the political speech of an individual or group who made the.., expenditure
'against' her (or in favor of her opponent) is impaired., 262 The infringement,
the court ruled, results from the rescue funds' "chilling effect" that occurs "even
before the state implements the statute's mandates. ' 263 In other words, the
Eighth Circuit determined that the sheer threat of rescue funds leads candidates
(or IE-making groups) to choose not to speak, and does not provide a potential
financial benefit to the candidate they oppose.2" Further, the Day court
concluded, the speech burden imposed by this resulting self-censorship proves
indistinguishable from direct govemment restriction.
265
Davis applied this same logic to its constitutional analysis of the
Millionaire's Amendment. The Court, by citing Day and ignoring the other
circuit decisions relied on so heavily by the district court,266 disregarded the
lower court's conclusion that the provision of a benefit fails to hamper
speech.267 Instead, Davis, like Day, found that granting a non-self-financing
candidate the advantage of asymmetrical contribution limits "chilled" the self-
financing candidate's speech.268 Similar to Day, however, the freeze did not
result directly from the self-financing candidate's subjection to the penalty of
"discriminatory fundraising limitations," but from the potentiality of triggering
those asymmetrical limits. The discriminatory ceilings meant that "the vigorous
exercise of [the self-financing candidate's] right to use personal funds to
261. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (presenting Daggett's refusal to accept
Day's logic, which Daggett declared equated responsive speech with an impairment on the
initial speaker's First Amendment rights).
262. Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1360 (8th Cir. 1994).
263. Id.
264. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text (explaining Day's conclusion that
rescue funds provisions chill protected political speech by causing a potential political speaker's
self-censorship because of the speaker's concern about providing a financial windfall to an
opposed candidate).
265. Supra note 126 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text (discussing the district court's ruling
on Davis in which it relied significantly on the circuit court opinions that stand in opposition to
Day in order to rule that the Millionaire's Amendment did not burden speech).
267. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (presenting the district court's declaration
that speech promoting benefits do not burden the First Amendment rights of the initial speaker
who triggers the benefit through her expenditure of personal funds).
268. See Letter from Albert Porroni to William Castner, supra note 260, at 5 (discussing
Davis's conclusion that the Millionaire's Amendment burdened speech by discouraging a self-
financing candidate's expenditure of personal funds).
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finance campaign speech [would] produce fundraising advantages for
opponents in the competitive context of electoral politics. ' 269 As a result, a
self-financing candidate's expenditure of too much personal wealth would
benefit her opponent's political voice; too little spending would hamper her
own. Consequently, as in Day, such a scheme could not stand because it had
potential to lead to self-censorship as a self-financing candidate had to either
"abide by a [self-imposed] limit on personal expenditures or endure the
burden.., placed on that right by activation of a scheme" that aided a rival
candidate's political voice through increased campaign funding.270
Davis establishes, therefore, that a candidate has "the right to be free from
government restrictions that abridge [her] own [First Amendment] rights in
order to enhance the relative voice of [her] opponent," even when that
abridgement arises indirectly out of a candidate's concern for a law's
consequences.271  A campaign finance regulation, like the Millionaire's
Amendment, that inflicts an "unprecedented penalty" on a candidate's speech,
therefore, substantially burdens the candidate's First Amendment rights if the
law causes the candidate-even without mandating it directly--to limit her own
political speech.
This framework by itself, however, does not answer the rescue funds issue.
It remains unresolved whether rescue funds rise to the level of a Millionaire's
Amendment-like "unprecedented penalty" that would invoke application of
Davis's burden standard. Supporters argue that rescue funds do not. They
exclaim that the Davis Court did not consider rescue funds' validity, and that,
therefore, Davis does not apply conclusively.2 72 These supporters, to advocate
that Davis does not affect the rescue funds question, primarily point to factual
disparities in how rescue funds provisions and the Millionaire's Amendment
operate.273 As discussed, when triggered, the Millionaire's Amendment
imposed discriminatory asymmetrical contribution limits on candidates.274 In
269. Supra note 208 and accompanying text.
270. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2772 (2008).
271. Supra note 256 and accompanying text.
272. See Ryan, supra note 225 (reminding that rescue funds "were not analyzed by the
Court in Davis" and that the differences between rescue funds and the Millionaire's Amendment
should result in courts finding that rescue funds remain constitutional).
273. See Response in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 245, at 11-
16 (arguing that there are key differences in the factual contexts of rescue funds and the
Millionaire's Amendment); Ryan, supra note 225 (discussing the factual differences between
the Millionaire's Amendment and rescue funds provisions and how they should lead courts to
uphold rescue funds).
274. See supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text (explaining the Millionaire's
Amendment's operative scheme).
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other words, when a self-financing candidate activated the clause, similarly
situated contestants for the same congressional seat, who "under the usual
circumstances" faced the same fundraising limits, became subject to varying
27contribution regulatory requirements.   This, in turn, created the
impermissible fundraising advantage for the non-self-financing candidate in the
competitive world of elections that promoted the self-financing candidate's
self-censorship. 276 Supporters argue that these discriminatory contribution
limits alone made the Millionaire's Amendment a "penalty" that served
"antithetical to the First Amendment. 2 77 They base this assertion on Davis's
statement that the Millionaire's Amendment would have survived constitutional
challenge had it raised each candidate's contribution limits-and thus absolved
any disparate impact-when triggered.278 Supporters claim that this dicta,
when combined with the Court's conclusion that the Millionaire's
Amendment's discriminatory fundraising limitations burdened speech, reveals
that Davis stands solely for the proposition that such disparate limits abridge
political speech.279
Pursuant to this interpretation, supporters declare that rescue funds cannot
cause the same burdens that bothered the Court in Davis. For instance,
supporters suggest that rescue funds, unlike the Millionaire's Amendment, do
not treat similarly situated candidates differently and, therefore, do not
discriminate amongst candidates. 280 Rather, "under the usual circumstances,"
supporters aver, the same restrictions do not apply to a participating and a
nonparticipating candidate.281 Instead, while a participating candidate receives
the benefits of public money, a nonparticipating candidate, supporters claim,
275. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2771 ("[The Millionaire's Amendment] raises the
[contribution] limits only for the non-self-financing candidate and does so only when the self-
financing candidate's expenditure of personal funds causes the OPFA threshold to be
exceeded.") (emphasis added).
276. Supra notes 208, 269.
277. Response in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 245, at 13.
278. Supra note 200 and accompanying text.
279. See Response in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 245, at 8-9
("The Court made clear that it was the discriminatory contribution limits before it in Davis that
made the Millionaire's Amendment unconstitutional .... Indeed the Court emphasized that the
statute would have imposed no burden on protected speech if Congress had simply raised
contribution limits for both candidates.").
280. See, e.g., id. at 14 (declaring that participating and nonparticipating candidates are not
similarly situated in North Carolina's full-public funding system).
281. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 225 ("In short, under usual circumstances, the same
restrictions do not apply to a candidate participating in a public financing program and a
candidate who is not. A participating candidate accepts significant burdens and disadvantages
vis-i-vis a nonparticipating candidate from the get-go.") (internal citations omitted).
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always faces "less restrictive campaign finance laws than [her] publicly-funded
opponent, even when a [rescue funds] provision is in effect., 282 Because of
these alleged omnipresent discrepancies in fundraising limitations, supporters
contend that Davis's penalty analysis cannot pertain to rescue funds because,
when triggered, rescue funds, unlike the Millionaire's Amendment, cannot
possibly provide discriminatory "fundraising advantages [to a participating
candidate]. 283  The participating candidate, instead, always encounters a
fundraising disadvantage compared with her nonparticipating opponent,
regardless of rescue funds.284
Supporters also proffer a second claimed factual distinction for why
Davis's concern with a candidate's being forced "to choose between
the.., right to engage in unfettered political speech and subjection to
discriminatory fundraising limitations" cannot arise under a public funding
system utilizing rescue funds.285 They point out the fact that public financing
programs do not subject the non-participating candidate to any additional
"fundraising limitations" after she triggers her participating opponent's
additional subsidy grant.286 Rather, supporters claim, the public funding
scheme only imposes strictures on the participating candidate subsequent to the
rescue funds' distribution.287
Because of these alleged discrepancies between the function of the
Millionaire's Amendment and rescue funds provisions, supporters contend that
Vote Choice and its progeny still control the rescue funds issue. Supporters
suggest that both public and private funding systems present their own
associated benefits and burdens.288 Because of these alternative costs and
282. Id.
283. See id. ("Whereas the Davis Court concluded that under the Millionaire's
Amendment, 'the vigorous exercise of the right to use personal funds to finance campaign
speech produce[d]fundraising advantages for opponents in the competitive context of electoral
politics,' the same cannot credibly be said about public financing program [rescue funds].").
284. Id.
285. Response in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 245, at 14-15;
see also Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 468
(1st Cir. 2000) (stating that "a non-participating candidate retains the ability to outraise and
outspend her participating opponent with abandon after" the rescue funds' disbursement).
286. Response in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 245, at 14-15
(claiming that after the issuance of the rescue funds match, the nonparticipating candidate has
no additional fundraising strictures imposed upon her by the public funding system).
287. See id. (stating that only the participating candidate faces the public funding system's
restrictions on funding and expenditures); Ryan, supra note 225 (discussing the limitations that
only the participating candidate faces).
288. See, e.g., Response in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 245,
at 14.
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benefits, supporters avow that, unless the relative burdens and benefits between
the public funding and private funding options become so extreme that they
obliterate the voluntary nature of the public financing alternative, each
candidate presumably selects the most rational preference for her campaign.289
So long as the participation remains voluntary, supporters argue, rescue funds
do not concern the First Amendment.29°
These contentions, however, fall short. Admittedly, the Millionaire's
Amendment and rescue funds are not the same, and the Davis Court did furnish
great attention to the existence of the asymmetry in the contribution limits.
29'
Supporters' factual discrepancy arguments, nevertheless, ignore the broad reach
of the Davis opinion's analysis of the "fundamental nature of the right to spend
personal funds for campaign speech." 292 The Court, for instance, established
that this First Amendment right means a "right to engage in unfetteredpolitical
speech.293 The Court's use of the word "unfettered," defined as "free" or
"unrestrained," proves telling.294 The word choice suggests that the Court
views the right to spend money on campaign speech as absolute, and leads one
to infer that even slight "restraint" on the right to spend limitless personal funds
penalizes speech broadly. Such an understanding receives some support from
Buckley's declaration that the First Amendment "cannot tolerate... restriction
upon the freedom of a candidate to speak without legislative limit on behalf of
[her] own candidacy. 2 95 Yet, Davis, itself, provides clear indication of this
inference's validity.
289. See id. (declaring that so long as participation in public funding remains voluntary, the
"rational candidate having knowledge of all.., respective benefits and burdens-including the
[rescue] funds provisions-will choose the option that she feels will maximize her
communication with the electorate"); see also supra notes 147, 148 and accompanying text
(presenting Vote Choice's voluntariness standard and the Daggett court's application of that
standard to rescue funds); cf supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing RNC's
declaration that when a public funding scheme does not coerce participation it merely presents
an option for a candidate and the rational candidate will choose the best alternative for her
campaign).
290. See Response in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 245, at 14
(declaring that no First Amendment impairment occurs as long as the differences between the
relative burdens and benefits of the two campaign funding alternatives do not coerce
participation) (citing Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205
F.3d 445,450 (1st Cir. 2000)).
291. See McComish v. Brewer, No. 08-1550, 2008 WL 4629337, at *6 (D. Ariz. Oct. 21,
2008) (admitting that the Millionaire's Amendment and rescue funds operate differently).
292. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759,2771 (2008).
293. Id. (emphasis added).
294. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S DiCnONARY 2068 (2d ed. 2009).
295. Supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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The Davis Court did so by referencing a brief filed by the FEC in the
case. 296 This citation appears to have received little, if any, attention from
commentators. However, the reference undeniably signals that rescue funds
serve as an impermissible penalty on the speech of a nonparticipating candidate
(or IE-making group) that, consequently, encourages their self-censorship. The
citation's accompanying parenthetical reads: "[C]onceding that [the
Millionaire's Amendment] does impose some consequences on a candidate's
choice to self-finance beyond certain amounts."297 This parenthetical sweeps
broadly. Davis's use of the word "some" suggests that if a campaign finance
law imposes any "consequences" on the right to spend limitless amounts of
personal funds, then that law penalizes speech. Pursuant to the Court's
endorsement of Day and Pacific Gas, this expansive First Amendment
protection indicates that any campaign finance regulation that promotes one
candidate's speech based off another candidate's (or IE-making group's)
exercise of her right to spend personal funds shall be deemed to impermissibly
penalize, and, thus, chill the initial candidate-speaker's (or IE-making group's)
speech.298
This includes rescue funds. A nonparticipating candidate (or IE-making
group) faces "some consequences," in the form of her opponent's receipt of an
additional public subsidy, on her choice to expend personal funds beyond a
"certain amount"-the statutorily imposed triggering threshold.2 9 The specific
benefit-granting mechanism triggered by candidate spending, therefore, has no
bearing on whether the regulation burdens speech, as any benefit-granting
scheme tied to personal expenditures burdens speech under Davis-including
rescue funds provisions. 300 The Millionaire's Amendment's fate, despite
supporters' claims, rested not on its specific disparate contribution limits
penalty, but on the general fact that the law tied "consequences" to candidate
spending.
296. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772 (2008) (quoting Brief for Appellee at 33, Davis v. FEC, 128
S. Ct. 2759 (2008) (No. 07-320)).
297. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Brief for Appellee at 29, Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759
(2008) (No. 07-320)).
298. See supra notes 25 1-71 (discussing the constitutional framework established byDavis
through the endorsement of logic from Pacific Gas and Day).
299. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (describing generally how the timing and
right to a disbursement of rescue funds to a participating candidate depends on a
nonparticipating candidate's (or IE-making group's) expenditure of personal money beyond a
triggering threshold amount).
300. See Letter from Albert Porroni to William Castner, supra note 260, at 5 (declaring that
rescue funds, like the Millionaire's Amendment, deter the freedom of expression of a
nonparticipating candidate or a group making an independent expenditure).
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Also, the Davis Court's broad language provides no support for the view
that candidates must be similarly situated in order for a First Amendment
burden to exist.301 Because rescue funds provisions place the consequence of
granting additional funding to an opponent on the participating candidate's
expenditure of money, judicial focus should center on the burden placed on the
nonparticipating candidate and not on the posture of her opponents.30 2 Further,
rescue funds provisions, pursuant to Davis, undermine the voluntariness of
public funding schemes.30 3 As in Davis, a nonparticipating candidate must
abide either by the expenditure restrictions inflicted by the rescue funds or
those imposed by the public funding scheme-"no option for 'unfettered
political speech"' exists.3
The expansive First Amendment right established in Davis also
undermines a prevalent common sense-based argument that supporters posit.
In short, supporters claim that, because Buckley established the State's right to
publicly finance campaigns,305 there exists no logical justification for
proscribing rescue funds as a means to administer the available public
306money. Because, under Buckley, "one lump-sum distribution of the
maximum amount available would not chill the First Amendment rights of the
nonparticipating candidates or prevent them from raising or spending as much
as they desire," supporters contend, "incremental distributions surely cannot do
SO. 3 07  This argument, however, loses its prudential force in light of a
candidate's (or IE-making group's) right to spend personal funds without
301. See Reply to Respondents' Brief in Opposition at 3, Duke v. Leake, 129 S. Ct. 490
(2008) (No. 08-120) ("Nothing in Davis requires a candidate to be similarly situated as her
opponents in order to assert a burden on her free speech rights .... The capacities of the other
candidates for office have no bearing on the credibility of the burden placed on a candidate
seeking relief from it.").
302. See, e.g., id. (declaring that, under Davis, it is the burden on the candidate and not the
analogous posture of candidate that is relevant to the First Amendment).
303. See McComish v. Brewer, No. 08-1550,2008 WL 4629337, at *6 (D. Ariz. Oct. 21,
2008) (referring to rescue funds as imposing a "coercive choice" on non-participating
candidates).
304. See Reply to Respondents' Brief in Opposition, supra note 301, at 3 (stating that,
under North Carolina's public funding system offering rescue funds, candidates lose any option
of whether to spend without limit on campaign speech because, either way, their spending will
be constrained).
305. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (presenting Buckley's finding of public
campaign financing's constitutionality).
306. See Response in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 245, at 16
(stating that the argument that "First Amendment rights are infringed merely because the
[government] provides funds to participating candidates incrementally rather than in one lump




bounds.3 °8 If the statute divorced the participating candidate's receipt of the
additional funds from the nonparticipating candidate's (or IE-making group's)
expenditure of personal money, this would avert all First Amendment
concerns. 309 However, once again, due to the fact that the distribution of rescue
funds relies entirely on the nonparticipating candidate's (or IE-making group's)
spending, the provisions impose "some consequences on [the] choice to self-
finance beyond [a] certain amount[]" and impermissibly burden speech.310 It is
the potentiality of self-censorship that results from the imposition of these
consequences that raises the First Amendment concerns.
31
2. Summary of Why Rescue Funds Burden Speech
In sum, Davis confirms that rescue funds impose a substantial burden on a
nonparticipating candidate's (or IE-making group's) exercise of First
Amendment-protected freedom of expression. Contrary to Daggett and its
progeny, Davis establishes that candidates (and IE-making groups) do,
312occasionally, have a right to speak free from response. Protection of this
right, under Davis, however, only manifests itself when the government seeks
to amplify the responsive speech of one candidate to such an extent that the
state abridges the First Amendment rights of an opponent.31 3 Yet, this
limitation proves meaningless as Davis also indicates that there exists a
boundless First Amendment right to spend unlimited amounts of personal funds
on campaign speech.314 Rescue funds, consequently, impermissibly abridge
this right because, although they do not directly restrict a nonparticipating
candidate's (or IE-making group's) speech, they do impose a substantial
penalty on any nonparticipating candidate (or IE-making group) who opts to
exercise her right to engage in unrestrained spending.315 This penalty, pursuant
308. Supra notes 293-98 and accompanying text.
309. See Reply to Respondents' Brief in Opposition, supra note 301, at 5 (arguing that if a
public funding scheme disbursed additional subsidy grants to participating candidates in
predetermined amounts and at predetermined times then no burden on free speech would be
incurred by her nonparticipating opponent).
310. Supra note 299 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 299 and accompanying text (suggesting that rescue funds provisions,
rather than disbursing additional money at predetermined times and in predetermined amounts,
burden speech because they make subsequent financing entirely contingent upon a
nonparticipating candidate's speech).
312. Supra notes 251-57 and accompanying text.
313. Supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.
314. Supra notes 293-98 and accompanying text.
315. Supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text.
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to Davis, results because rescue funds provisions attach "some
consequences"-the disbursement of campaign money to an election
opponent-on the nonparticipating candidate's (or IE-making group's)
expenditure of personal funds beyond a triggering threshold.316 Such a
"consequence" on campaign spending, just like a direct expenditure limit,
reduces outlays of personal funds. 317 After Davis, such a scheme substantially
burdens speech.
B. Strict Scrutiny Review
"Because [rescue funds] impose[] a substantial burden on the exercise of
the First Amendment right to use personal funds for campaign speech, [the]
provision[s] cannot stand unless [they are] justified by a compelling state
interest.0 18 Pursuant to Davis's narrow compelling state interest standard,
rescue funds appear doomed.31 9 Davis, for instance, entirely usurps the most
common justification for rescue funds. Supporters aver that rescue funds help
to close the gap between wealthy candidates, who can afford to spend large
sums of their personal fortune on their campaign, and candidates receiving
public funding, who as a consequence face restrictive expenditure
limitations. 320 After Davis, the "level electoral opportunities for candidates of
different personal wealth" argument no longer adequately justifies a campaign
finance law.321
Supporters, however, have suggested that rescue funds serve other state
interests as well. For instance, some rescue funds advocates contend, like Vote
316. Supra note 299 and accompanying text.
317. Supra notes 266-70 and accompanying text.
318. Supra note 214 and accompanying text.
319. See supra Part VI.C.2 (presenting Davis's application of strict scrutiny to the
Millionaire's Amendment and the limited scope of compelling state interests that the Court
viewed as justifying campaign finance regulations).
320. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (describing Clean Elections' rescue funds'
aim of leveling electoral opportunities for candidates of varying wealth); Letter from Albert
Porroni to William Castner, supra note 260, at 4-5 ("[Tlhe only purpose served by providing
additional public funds to candidates participating in a public financing program in order to
counter an opponent's expenditures above a threshold amount, or [IEs] that have a negative
effect, is to create a more level playing field by equalizing funding between candidates.").
321. See supra notes 216-21 and accompanying text (discussing Davis's rejection of the
government's equal playing field interest as justification for the Millionaire's Amendment's
imposed First Amendment burden); McComish v. Brewer, No. 08-1550,2008 WL 4629337, at
*6 (D. Ariz. Oct. 21, 2008) (explaining that Davis explicitly rejected the idea that leveling
political opportunities served as a compelling state interest).
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Choice, Daggett, and Gable, that governments have a compelling interest in
ensuring the success of their public funding schemes via incentives, like rescue
funds, that encourage candidate participation in the programs.322 Other
supporters claim that states have a compelling interest in protecting efficient
allocation of the public fisc. 32 3 This second assertion arises out of Buckley.
The Buckley Court, in analyzing a Fifth Amendment equal protection challenge
against the presidential election public funding system's higher allocation of
funds to major party candidates,324 stated that, due to the scarcity of public
resources, there existed an important state interest in protecting the public
wealth that justified treating candidates differently. 325  Based on this
declaration, supporters claim that governments have a compelling justification
for retaining as much supplementary public money as they can until they are
able to identify the campaigns most in need of added subsidies.326
Admittedly, each of these laudable interests appears important but neither
likely rises to the level of "compelling. 3 27 Davis declares that the Court's
campaign finance precedents indicate that only the prevention of political
process corruption (or appearance of corruption) has thus far been deemed
328adequate to justify a campaign finance regulation. This statement by the
Court suggests that "few interests indeed would be sufficient to justify such
322. See supra notes 150-51, 166 and accompanying text (presenting Vote Choice's,
Daggett's, and Gable's conclusions that encouraging participation in the public financing
system serves as a compelling interest to justify using rescue funds as incentives).
323. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 225 (claiming that rescue funds are necessary for the
efficient allocation of public resources and therefore help to protect the public fisc).
324. See supra note 78 (mentioning that, in addition to a First Amendment challenge, the
presidential election public funding system was also challenged on Fifth Amendment grounds in
Buckley).
325. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 (1976) (per curiam) (stating that Congress has
an important "interest in not funding hopeless candidacies with large sums of public money,"
which justifies "the withholding public assistance from candidates without significant public
support").
326. See Response in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 245, at 18
(stating that rescue funds help with the important government interest in conserving scarce
public resources); Ryan, supra note 225 ("[A] court following Buckley should recognize that
just as the presidential public financing program's provisions allocating precious limited public
resources to races where they are most needed.., advances the governmental interest in
protecting the public fisc, so too do [rescue funds]."); cf Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental
Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 469 (1st Cir. 2000) (claiming that rescue funds
provisions allow a state to "effectively dispense limited resources while allowing participating
candidates to respond in races where the most debate is needed").
327. See, e.g., supra note 129 (presenting Day's doubt regarding the compelling nature of a
government interest in encouraging candidates to participate in public funding via rescue funds).
328. Supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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restraints,3 29 and neither of the supporters' asserted additional interests appear
to serve an anti-corruption purpose. The important interest in preservation of
public money and the efficient allocation of limited resources, for example,
clearly serves no anticorruption objective and, nevertheless, likely would fail on
narrowly tailored grounds because alternatives exist for altering initial
allocations that do not require burdening speech.33°
A stronger argument exists regarding the anticorruption purpose behind
the interest in encouraging public funding system participation. Buckley stated
that public financing itself serves an anticorruption function by eliminating the
influence of large private contributions. 331 This could suggest that, because a
state has a goal of reducing corruption (or apparent corruption), to achieve the
aim of eradicating corruption, "the state has a related compelling interest in
assuring reasonable levels of participation in the program, by convincing
candidates to opt in and to forgo their right to raise and spend an unlimited
amount of private funds. 3 32 The flaw with this claim lies in the fact that it
switches focus back to the public funding scheme and away from the burden
imposed on the nonparticipating candidate's (or IE-making group's) First
Amendment right to make "unfettered" campaign expenditures. Buckley
established that candidate personal expenditures reduce the corruption threat.333
Rescue funds, however, discourage the expenditure of personal funds.
Therefore, "[t]he burden imposed by [rescue funds] on the expenditure of
personal funds is not justified by any governmental interest in eliminating
corruption or the perception of corruption" because discouraging the
expenditure of personal money "disserves the anticorruption interest."334 Thus
in light of Davis's limited compelling state interest standard, and the absence of
an apparent anticorruption purpose, the substantial First Amendment burden
imposed by Clean Elections' rescue funds provisions proves unconstitutional.
329. McComish v. Brewer, No. 08-1550, 2008 WL 4629337, at *9 (D. Ariz. Oct. 21,
2008).
330. See, e.g., id. (acknowledging a flaw in the efficient allocation of public funds as a
compelling state interest argument because alternative options for adjusting public funding
without burdening a nonparticipating candidate's speech exist).
331. Supra note 79 and accompanying text.
332. Response in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 245, at 17-18.
333. Supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.




Clean Elections have been trumpeted by supporters as the "wave of the
future" in campaign finance reform.335 Advocates suggest that these full public
funding programs serve as the most effective way to obviate lobbyist influence
on political policy because once the campaign "money chase" ends, "elected
officials [become] far less susceptible to some of the attractions that lobbyists
can offer," and can focus, instead, on their agenda while on the campaign
trail.336 The primary impediment to effective administration of Clean Elections
has long been the risk of candidates being deterred from accepting public funds
because of the threat of limitless spending by nonparticipating opponents and,
more significantly, independent groups making hostile IEs.337 Believing that
"there is no good reason to allow disparities in wealth to be translated into
disparities in political power, ,38 states and municipalities created rescue funds
to alleviate this one-sided spending and to encourage participation in their
339public funding systems.  In Davis's wake, however, these special benefits no
longer function as a constitutionally viable response to one-sided spending and
legislatures in Clean Elections jurisdictions must anticipate litigation seeking to
invalidate their rescue funds provisions. And, they should expect the courts to
rule in the challengers' favor.34° Similarly, legislators in other jurisdictions
should be wary of any calls for Clean Elections reforms, in general, and Clean
Elections programs utilizing rescue funds provisions, specifically. Congress,
too, should abandon its thoughts of including rescue funds in federal Clean
Elections legislation.34'
335. Peggy Fikac, Clean Elections Might Wash Away Money's Imprint, SAN ANTONIO
ExPREss-NEws, http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/MYSA041506_IA lobby-solutions_223
83de4_htm12151 .html (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
336. Id.
337. See Hasen, supra note 224 (discussing how one-sided IEs serve as the biggest concern
to effective state and local public funding systems).
338. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2781 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal
citations omitted).
339. See, e.g., Marin Clean Elections FAQ, http://marincleanelections.org/recent-posts (last
visited Sept. 29, 2009) (calling Clean Elections "the most effective reform to reduce the
frequency and influence of IEs" due to the allowance of rescue funds) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
340. See, e.g., Letter from Albert Porroni to William Castner, supra note 260, at 5 ("[I]t is
our opinion that if [New Jersey's rescue funds legislation] is enacted into law .... a reviewing
court would likely find the rescue money provisions to violate the First Amendment.").
341. SeeFairElectionsNow Act, S. 1285,110th Cong. § 511 (2007)(callingforthelawto
provide "Fair Fight" rescue funds for participating Senate candidates).
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Thus, Davis, by invalidating rescue funds, has "blown a hole in effective
public financing plans. '' 4 2 As a consequence, the once-proclaimed "wave of
the future" appears on the verge of crashing. For that very reason, although
"Heller [was] a huge case[,] .. . in terms of affecting policies that might
actually be enacted, it may not be as important as... Davis."
343
342. Hasen, supra note 224.
343. Esenberg, supra note 12.
1314
